

Varieties of Linked Fate:

Expansive and Exclusive Forms of Black Solidarity

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Abstract

What are the limits of linked fate? Dawson (1994) argued linked fate sustains Black political cohesion, while Cohen (1999) showed group members can engage in “secondary marginalization” against subgroups. We distinguish “Expansive” linked fate (intragroup plus cross-group solidarity) from “Exclusive” linked fate (intragroup solidarity alone). Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey ($N=3,102$ Black respondents), 40% are Expansive, predicting 5–12pp more likely to prioritize concerns of marginalized subgroups; 26% are Exclusive, showing no boost for Black gays and lesbians and modest support for Muslim candidates. In a survey experiment ($N=1,050$), support for a liberal Black candidate drops 9–17pp when described as Muslim or gay, and linked fate alone does not moderate effect. Using religiosity as a proxy for absence of cross-group solidarity, we find predicted heterogeneity: high linked fate/low religiosity respondents (putatively Expansive) show minimal bias; high linked fate/high religiosity respondents (putatively Exclusive) show substantial bias. The question is not only whether fate is linked, but to whom.

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*Replication materials, including data and code, will be available in the Harvard Dataverse at [DOI]. The CMPS 2016 data are publicly available from the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey. The experimental survey data were collected by the authors and will be included in the replication archive. Refine.ink used to proofread and Claude Code used to prepare replication archive.

1 Introduction

What are the limits of linked fate? Dawson (1994) found that, despite growing class diversity, African Americans vote as a remarkably cohesive bloc due to a historically grounded sense of linked fate in which group interests reliably approximate self-interest. In contrast, looking at how Black institutions responded to the AIDS crisis, Cohen (1999) documented “secondary marginalization,” whereby group solidarity did *not* protect gay Black men from discrimination by other community members. How can the Black community’s strong sense of linked fate produce both meaningful cohesion and exclusion?

We argue this seeming contradiction reflects issues with both theory and method that have obscured within-group heterogeneity. The theoretical issue is that the puzzle linked fate purports to solve may be misconceived. Dawson asked why affluent Black Americans do not vote Republican despite economic self-interest for policies like lower taxes, proposing linked fate as the mechanism through which historical experience of discrimination translates into individual political behavior. But as Frymer (1999) observed, Black voters are “captured” in the Democratic Party—not primarily by linked fate, but by a partisan landscape in which one party is perceived as actively hostile to Black interests. Regardless of class position, most people do not vote for parties that make them feel like “the enemy” (Postrel 1999). Linked fate may help stabilize this alignment once established, but if partisan polarization on racial issues is sufficient to explain Black political cohesion, linked fate’s independent causal role becomes difficult to isolate. Consistent with this view, Hutchings and Jefferson (2014) find that linked fate does not significantly predict Democratic partisanship among Black Americans once support for activist government and in-group racial identity are controlled.

Partisan capture can help explain Democratic vote share but not choices *within* the coalition. It is in these within-party contexts—where partisanship provides no guide—that linked fate’s explanatory power can be meaningfully tested, and within-group heterogeneity becomes visible. Yet linked fate scholarship has largely focused on cross-party comparisons, where ceiling effects leave little variance to explain. The problem is twofold: the outcome exhibits a ceiling (approximately 90 percent Democratic voting), and so does the predictor (two-thirds to three-quarters of Black respondents affirm linked fate). When both dependent and independent variables are compressed at the high end, the measure has limited ability to account for the heterogeneity that remains. Yet Black Americans who affirm linked fate differ meaningfully in their attitudes toward marginalized subgroups—which suggests the standard measure conflates distinct orientations. In this context, disaggregation is not merely useful but necessary.

A second theoretical issue is that linked fate scholarship implicitly treats “Black Americans” as a stable, bounded category. But as Brubaker (2002) emphasizes, group boundaries are not given—they are constructed and continuously negotiated. Similar critiques have emerged in Latino politics, where Beltrán (2010) argues that appeals to pan-ethnic unity obscure deep disagreements about political priorities and group boundaries. Who counts as fully part of “us” is itself a political question. The standard linked fate framework captures whether individuals *perceive* their fate as linked to the group, but not how they *define* the group to which their fate is linked. A respondent who affirms linked fate may extend solidarity broadly to all who share Black identity, or may draw narrower boundaries that exclude those perceived as marginal—gay, Muslim, immigrant, or otherwise not prototypical (Cohen 1999).

The methodological issue is that most surveys contain too few Black respondents to study within-group variation with any precision. With typical samples of 200–400 Black respondents, scholars can compare Black Americans to other groups but cannot examine heterogeneity *among* them. This has channeled research toward between-group comparisons while leaving within-group variation undertheorized and underexplored—even as Black Americans themselves recognize this diversity. Cultural critics have long noted the post-civil rights explosion of diverse Black experiences (Ellis 1989). A 2007 Pew survey found that 37% of Black Americans said that, due to growing diversity within their community, “Blacks can no longer be thought of as a single race” (Pew Research Center 2007). The 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), with its large Black oversample ($N=3,102$), provides an opportunity to examine this variation directly.

Drawing on these data, we introduce and test a two-dimensional model of linked fate. The first dimension captures traditional *intragroup* linked fate: whether one’s welfare is tied to Black Americans as a whole. The second dimension captures *cross-group* linked fate: whether solidarity extends to other marginalized groups (immigrants, LGBTQ people, other minorities). Crossing these dimensions yields four types. “Expansive” linked fate combines high intragroup solidarity with high cross-group solidarity. “Exclusive” linked fate reflects high intragroup solidarity with low cross-group solidarity, a bounded solidarity that excludes those at the margins.

In the CMPS data, we find that approximately 40% of African Americans have Expansive linked fate, which predicts an additional boost in support for addressing challenges faced by Black lesbians and gays (LG) and other marginalized subgroups. Another 26% have Exclusive linked fate, which shows no boost for LG support compared to those without linked fate. However, Exclusive linked fate does show a modest

boost for Muslim candidates. When these types are aggregated in the standard measure, linked fate appears to predict attitudinal support (driven by the larger Expansive bloc) while masking the substantial minority for whom group consciousness provides little to no additional solidarity toward the margins. We replicate these patterns using a multi-item Black Consciousness Index, confirming the results are not an artifact of the binary linked fate measure.

We then test this framework in a survey experiment with 1,050 Black respondents. Participants choose between two Black Democratic candidates—one more moderate and one more liberal—with the more liberal candidate described as Muslim or gay in treatment conditions. This design potentially creates cross-pressure between policy alignment and identity, providing a behavioral test of whether linked fate extends to marginalized subgroup members. Consistent with our framework, we find that the standard linked fate measure shows no moderating effect: high and low linked fate respondents show parallel reductions in support for the Muslim or gay candidate. However, using religiosity as a proxy for the cross-group solidarity dimension, we find the predicted heterogeneity: among high linked fate respondents, those with low religiosity (putatively Expansive) show minimal bias, while those with high religiosity (putatively Exclusive) show substantial bias.

These findings make three contributions. First, we introduce a two-dimensional framework that distinguishes Expansive from Exclusive linked fate, partly reconciling tensions between Dawson’s emphasis on group solidarity and Cohen’s model of secondary marginalization. Second, we provide what we believe is the first experimental test of Cohen’s theory of “secondary marginalization” among African Americans, demonstrating that even respondents with high linked fate penalize marginalized candidates (cf. Bunyasi and Smith 2019; Magni and Reynolds 2021; Oforu, Posner, and Jessee 2023). Third, we show that approximately one-quarter of Black Americans have Exclusive linked fate, explaining why a sense of shared group destiny can coexist with secondary marginalization, and why appeals to racial solidarity alone may be insufficient for building inclusive coalitions.

2 Theory

Scholarship on Black political behavior has developed along three largely separate tracks: (1) the orthodox linked fate tradition emphasizing group solidarity; (2) critics who question whether linked fate explains what it claims; and (3) work on intersectionality and cross-group solidarity.

2.1 Linked Fate as Overarching Concept

Dawson (1994) observed that despite growing class diversity, African Americans continued to vote as a remarkably unified bloc. Dawson proposed that Black voters rely on a “Black utility heuristic,” using perceptions of group benefit as a proxy for individual interests. Because historical discrimination created a strong link between individual and group welfare, Black Americans developed an efficient cognitive shortcut: evaluating political choices based on what is good for the group rather than calculating individual costs and benefits.

Building on earlier work on group consciousness and political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1981; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989), the linked fate concept has become foundational in the race and ethnic politics literature. The standard measure asks: “Do you think what happens generally to [Black] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” Decades of research show that two-thirds to three-quarters of Black Americans answer affirmatively, and that linked fate predicts liberal policy attitudes, Democratic partisanship, and support for race-conscious policies (Broockman 2013).

2.2 Does Linked Fate Explain What It Claims?

A growing body of scholarship challenges whether linked fate actually explains Black political behavior. Most prominently, White and Laird (2020) argue that “racialized social constraint”—enforced norms and social pressure from other Black community members—better explains Black political unity than linked fate. Through experiments and survey analysis, they show that Black political unity is actively maintained through social enforcement rather than emerging from shared psychological identification. Their work suggests linked fate may be a by-product rather than a cause of political unity.

Other scholars raise complementary concerns. Gay, Hochschild, and White (2016) found that linked fate expressions are similar across racial groups and only weakly associated with political participation—raising questions about whether the measure actually reflects what it purports to capture. Rogers and Kim (2023) argue that linked fate scholarship has glossed over the historical and social conditions under which group consciousness translates into political behavior, calling for renewed attention to elite agency and group-level practices. Kim and Yan (2021) show that survey respondents interpret the standard linked fate question in distinct ways—some emphasizing shared vulnerability to discrimination (“linked hurt”) while others focus on collective advancement (“linked progress”)—with different political consequences. Taken together, these

critiques complicate linked fate as a unidimensional explanation, but they stop short of specifying why strong intragroup solidarity sometimes coincides with systematic exclusion of particular subgroups. What remains undertheorized is how individuals who affirm linked fate draw boundaries around who counts as part of the group (Barth 1969; Brubaker 2002).

2.3 The Boundaries of Solidarity

Cohen (1999) offered a different challenge to Dawson’s framework through her concept of “secondary marginalization”—the process by which subgroups within Black communities face internal exclusion based on stigmatized characteristics such as sexuality or drug use. Examining how Black institutions responded to the AIDS crisis, Cohen documented how privileged members of a marginalized group discriminate against subgroups perceived as threatening the community’s public image. Rather than extending solidarity to gay Black men and injection drug users, many Black institutions distanced themselves from populations seen as damaging the group’s standing.

Cohen distinguished “consensus” issues—those seen as benefiting the entire group—from “cross-cutting” issues that disproportionately affect certain subgroups. Cross-cutting issues may be deprioritized or opposed by group leaders seeking to maintain respectability (Higginbotham 1993; Harris 2014). Bunyasi and Smith (2019) developed this insight further, identifying respectability politics as a key mechanism limiting solidarity with marginalized subgroups. Using the same 2016 CMPS data we analyze here, they show that linked fate predicts support for Black women, formerly incarcerated Blacks, undocumented Black immigrants, and lesbian, gay, and transgender Black individuals—but that endorsement of respectability norms (prioritizing two-parent families, accepting racial profiling as a law enforcement tool) serves as a “countervailing force” that substantially reduces support. Their work demonstrates that linked fate has limits: strong intragroup solidarity does not automatically extend to subgroups perceived as violating respectability norms.

The Black church plays a dual role in this dynamic: as a source of political mobilization and a site where community boundaries are enforced (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Harris-Lacewell 2007). Religious teachings on sexuality have shaped Black attitudes toward LGBTQ issues, creating tension between racial solidarity and acceptance of sexual minorities (Boykin 1998; Tucker-Worgs and Worgs 2014). Highly religious Black voters may express strong linked fate while opposing candidates associated with LGBTQ rights. Data from the General Social Survey shows opposition to same-sex relations declined substantially from 1973 through

2022, though Black Americans remain more opposed than whites, on average [Davern et al. (2024); see Figure A.1].

2.4 Extensions Beyond Single Groups

Recent scholarship has extended linked fate beyond single-group solidarity (Tormos 2017; Crowder 2025). Gershon et al. (2019) introduced “minority linked fate”—solidarity extending to other ethnoracial minorities—and “intersectional linked fate,” capturing solidarity based on shared racial and gender marginalization. Also using the 2016 CMPS, Chan and Jasso (2023) showed that minority linked fate predicts system-challenging participation among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Macías Mejía (2024) found that “immigrant linked fate” predicts political participation for Latinos and Blacks. Across this literature, combining dimensions often predicts political attitudes and participation better than single-group measures alone (Campi and Junn 2019; Harnois 2015; Nguy, Davis, and Chan 2025; Magni and Chan 2025).

2.5 Heterogeneity Within Groups

This literature has made substantial progress distinguishing intragroup from cross-group solidarity. What remains less developed is a *typological* approach. Bunyasi and Smith (2019) treat respectability politics as a countervailing force that moderates linked fate’s effects. We propose instead that cross-group solidarity constitutes a second dimension of linked fate itself, producing qualitatively distinct types. The question is not just *whether* linked fate predicts support for marginalized subgroups, but *which kind* of linked fate—why do some individuals with high intragroup linked fate extend solidarity to marginalized subgroups while others do not? The standard one-dimensional measure implicitly assumes solidarity extends equally to all group members. But as Cohen (1999) demonstrates, a strong sense of linked fate often fails to predict broad inclusion. We argue this failure results from the conflation of two different orientations:

- *Expansive linked fate*: High intragroup solidarity combined with cross-group solidarity (cf. Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2016; Craig and Richeson 2016; Greenwood 2008)
- *Exclusive linked fate*: High intragroup solidarity without cross-group solidarity (cf. Kustov 2021’s “parochial altruism”)

This distinction parallels Putnam (2000)’s contrast between “bonding” social capital (inward-looking ties that reinforce group identity) and “bridging” social capital (outward-looking ties that connect diverse groups).

Expansive linked fate combines both; Exclusive linked fate features bonding without bridging. Critically, both orientations produce identical responses to the standard linked fate question but have distinct implications for solidarity with marginalized subgroups.

While we develop and test this framework among Black Americans, the underlying logic should generalize. Any community with a sense of shared fate will contain members who vary in how expansively they define the boundaries of belonging. The four types we identify—Individualist, Cosmopolitan, Exclusive, and Expansive—offer a template for studying boundary politics wherever group identity is salient. Figure 1 presents our two-dimensional framework.

INTRAGROUP LINKED FATE	High	Exclusive <i>“I do not support gay people”</i> — <i>“I just wish this person wasn’t a Muslim”</i>	Expansive <i>“As a gay Black man, I think he understands the fight behind making the world more inclusive”</i>
	Low	Individualist <i>“It really doesn’t matter to me either way”</i> — <i>“His agenda would be more beneficial to me”</i>	Cosmopolitan <i>“For justice and welfare of all people of all races”</i> — <i>“I don’t care about his religion; everyone should have religious freedom”</i>
		Low	High
		CROSS-GROUP LINKED FATE	

Figure 1: A Two-Dimensional Typology of Linked Fate. Quotes are verbatim from Study 3 open-ended responses. The standard measure captures only the vertical dimension, conflating Expansive and Exclusive types.

The four types are generally demographically similar but attitudinally distinct (Table A.2). Irrespective of type, the demographics cluster tightly: 51–57% female, 42–45 years old, \$44K–\$49K mean household income, and 44–48% highly religious. Education most clearly differentiates the types: 25% of Expansive types hold a college degree compared to 14% of Individualists ($p < .001$). Party identification also varies modestly, with 64–72% identifying as Democrats across types ($p = .03$). What distinguishes the types is not primarily *who they are* but *what they believe* about the boundaries of belonging. On outcomes, the differences are more substantial: support for Black gays and lesbians ranges from 68% (Individualist) to 82% (Expansive), and willingness to vote for a Muslim candidate ranges from 65% to 80%.

This pattern merits emphasis. In the pooled data, religiosity and conservatism predict lower support for Black LG issues (Section 3.4). Yet religiosity is evenly distributed across types—roughly 45% of each type is highly religious. The typology thus captures something distinct from religiosity: how individuals draw the boundaries of solidarity. Expansive and Exclusive types do not differ because the former are less religious; they differ in whether they extend solidarity across identity boundaries. Similarly, although Expansive types are somewhat more Democratic and less conservative, all regression models control for party identification and ideology, and the typology remains a significant predictor of outcomes net of these controls.

3 Study 1: Observational Evidence

3.1 Data and Methods

The Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) is a multiracial, multilingual post-election survey conducted December 2016–February 2017 with 3,102 Black respondents (Frasure et al. 2022). The survey was designed by 86 scholars across 55 universities and includes questions on political attitudes, experiences with discrimination, and group consciousness. The CMPS provides unusually rich measures for testing our theoretical framework, including both standard linked fate and items capturing cross-group solidarity.

Linked Fate: Respondents were asked: “Do you think what happens generally to [Black] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” (67% answered “Yes”). This is the standard measure used throughout the literature.

Support for Marginalized Subgroups: Respondents rated how important it is “for Blacks to address the challenges” of five subgroups: Black gays and lesbians (LG), Black transgender people, Black women, Black undocumented immigrants, and formerly incarcerated Black people. Response options were: Not important at all (1), Somewhat important (2), Very important (3). These items directly measure attitudes toward marginalized subgroups within the Black community—the core outcome of interest for testing secondary marginalization.

Muslim Candidate Support: Respondents indicated whether they would vote for a Muslim American man and, separately, woman for Congress, providing a parallel measure to our experimental treatments in Study 3.

Cross-Group Linked Fate: We construct an index (the mean of three items) measuring perceived linked fate with LGBTQ people, immigrants, and other racial minorities. Each item asks whether “what happens

to [group] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life.” By combining these items, we capture a general orientation toward cross-group solidarity distinct from intragroup linked fate (see Table A.5 for variable codes and question wording).¹

Linked Fate Types: Crossing standard linked fate (high vs. low) with cross-group linked fate (high vs. low, via median split) yields four types that operationalize our theoretical framework: Individualist (low on both), Cosmopolitan (low intragroup, high cross-group), Exclusive (high intragroup, low cross-group), and Expansive (high on both). This typology enables us to test whether the standard linked fate measure combines distinct orientations with different political implications.

Controls: All models include age, gender, education, party identification, income, ideology, religiosity, and three measures of respectability politics following Bunyasi and Smith (2019): endorsement of two-parent family structures, acceptance of racial profiling, and a net score capturing individualist versus structural attributions of racial inequality. For the black LG outcome, we also include whether the respondent personally knows an LGBTQ person.

Missing Data: We address missing data using multiple imputation (MI) (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011), as listwise deletion would drop about 30% or 936 of the respondents from our analytic sample. We impute five datasets using predictive mean matching and pool estimates using standard rules (Rubin 1987). Results are substantively similar using either multiple imputation or listwise deletion.

3.2 Prevalence of Secondary Marginalization

Before testing our framework, we document the prevalence of attitudes consistent with secondary marginalization.

Table 1: Prevalence of Secondary Marginalization Attitudes (CMPS)

Measure	Percent
Not Important: LGBT	23.9
Not Important: Trans	25.2
Wouldn't Vote: Muslim Man	28.2
Wouldn't Vote: Muslim Woman	23.6

¹The classification items measuring cross-group linked fate (e.g., “will what happens to LGBTQ people affect your life?”) are conceptually distinct from the outcome items measuring support for marginalized subgroups (e.g., “how important is it for Blacks to address LG challenges?”). The former taps perceived interdependence of fates; the latter taps normative support for group priorities. The correlation between these measures is moderate ($r = 0.26$), confirming they are related but separable constructs. As a robustness check, we re-estimated our models using a cross-group index that excludes the LGBTQ linked fate item entirely; results are substantively unchanged (see Table A.12).

As seen in Table 1, approximately one-quarter of Black respondents say addressing challenges facing Black gays and lesbians is “not important at all,” and about the same share say they would not vote for a Muslim for Congress. These proportions suggest that secondary marginalization is not a fringe phenomenon but a significant feature of Black public opinion. We test this finding experimentally in Study 3.

3.3 Standard Linked Fate Predicts Attitudinal Support

Standard linked fate predicts greater attitudinal support for marginalized subgroups in the CMPS data. Logistic regressions show that linked fate is positively and significantly associated with support for all five marginalized subgroups (see Table A.6). The odds of supporting efforts to address challenges faced by African Americans who are gay or lesbian, transgender, women, immigrants, or formerly incarcerated are 32–88% higher among those with high linked fate (compared to low linked fate). Similarly, higher linked fate is significantly associated with greater willingness to vote for a Muslim candidate ($p < .05$ for both male and female candidates).

This raises the central puzzle motivating our paper: if standard linked fate predicts liberal attitudes toward marginalized subgroups, why does a range of prior research find that group solidarity often fails to include marginalized subgroup members? As Cohen (1999) documented in the Black community’s response to AIDS, and as subsequent work has confirmed (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016; White and Laird 2020), linked fate’s behavioral effects are often weaker than its attitudinal effects would suggest. Our two-dimensional framework offers a partial resolution: the standard linked fate measure conflates two distinct types with different orientations toward cross-group solidarity.

3.4 Who Engages in Secondary Marginalization?

Before presenting the main results of Study 1, we examine who is most likely to draw distinctions between their own interests and marginalized subgroups. Those who say addressing Black LG challenges is “not important” share a distinctive profile: they are more likely to be highly religious, more conservative, and less likely to know an LGBTQ person personally (see Table A.9). This profile—highly religious, more conservative, without personal LGBTQ contact—suggests a coherent segment of the Black electorate that combines strong racial identification with limited cross-group solidarity.

3.5 Varieties of Linked Fate

Figure 2 presents predicted probabilities by linked fate type. Consistent with Dawson (1994), all four types exhibit supermajority support. The key distinction: Expansive types show significantly higher support across all outcomes, while Exclusive types show levels comparable to Individualists—high intragroup linked fate alone does not boost support for marginalized subgroups (see Table A.4 for exact percentages).




Figure 2: Study 1: Predicted probability of supporting marginalized subgroups by linked fate type ($N=3,102$, multiple imputation; Individualist $n=745$, Cosmopolitan $n=277$, Exclusive $n=800$, Expansive $n=1,280$). Lower braces show comparisons vs. Individualist (reference); upper brace shows Expansive vs. Exclusive contrast. Exclusive shows no significant boost for Black LG but modest support for Muslim candidates; Expansive shows significantly higher support across all outcomes. Study 3 tests these outcomes experimentally. See Tables A.10 and A.11 for regression results.

Figure 2 presents predicted probabilities from regression models. As the key contrasts are Exclusive vs. Expansive, Exclusive vs. Individualist, and Expansive vs. Individualist, we order the x -axis accordingly. Support remains high across all four types, indicating this is not a story of widespread hostility. The key difference is that Expansive linked fate predicts meaningfully *higher* support, while Exclusive linked fate shows no boost for Black LG ($p = 0.95$)—meaning Exclusives, despite high linked fate, are statistically indistinguishable from Individualists on this outcome—but does show a modest boost for Muslim candidates (male: $p = 0.04$; female: $p = 0.1$). Compared to Individualists, Expansive linked fate strongly predicts support across all outcomes ($p < .001$ in each case). The magnitude of the Expansive effect is comparable to or larger than other established predictors in our models, including religiosity and ideology (see Tables A.10 and A.11). Critically, these effects are robust to controlling for respectability politics—endorsement of traditional family structures, acceptance of racial profiling, and individualist attributions of inequality (Bunyasi and

Smith 2019). Adding these controls actually *strengthens* the Expansive-Exclusive contrast slightly, suggesting that the typology captures something distinct from respectability norms (see Section A.8).

Extending this analysis to additional subgroups reveals that “Exclusive” solidarity operates along specific boundaries rather than reflecting blanket rejection of marginalized subgroups (Table A.7). Exclusive types show no significant boost in support for Black LG or transgender subgroups, but *do* show significantly higher support for Black women, undocumented immigrants, and formerly incarcerated individuals. The pattern is thus subgroup-specific. Expansive types, by contrast, show significant boosts across all five subgroups.²

4 Study 2: Construct Validation with Alternative Measure

Does the Expansive-Exclusive distinction depend on how we measure intragroup solidarity? Study 1 relied on the standard linked fate question—a single binary item. Study 2 substitutes an original measure we develop: the Black Consciousness Index (BCI), a multi-item scale capturing behavioral engagement with and attitudinal commitment to the Black community (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Miller et al. 1981). If the pattern replicates with a different operationalization, it suggests genuine heterogeneity rather than measurement artifact.

4.1 Measuring Black Consciousness

The BCI combines six items capturing self-reported behaviors and attitudes related to engagement with and commitment to the Black community: African American media consumption (TV programs, websites), Black Lives Matter movement support, and beliefs about Black economic and political self-determination (see Section A.9 for full details). We follow standard practice in scale construction by standardizing each item (z -score) and taking the mean. The resulting index shows acceptable internal reliability ($\alpha = 0.7$) and correlates moderately with binary linked fate ($r = 0.29$), suggesting these measures capture related but distinct aspects of intragroup consciousness (Sanchez and Vargas 2016). We construct the BCI-based typology by crossing high/low BCI (median split) with high/low cross-group linked fate (same measure as Study 1). This produces the same four types—Individualist, Cosmopolitan, Exclusive, Expansive—but with intragroup consciousness measured from six varied questions rather than through a single attitudinal item.

²As a discriminant validity check, we tested whether the typology predicts general immigration policy attitudes and explicitly political outcomes (presidential vote, congressional vote, party identification). The typology shows no significant effects on any of these outcomes after controlling for ideology (all $p > .05$ for political outcomes; $p = .74$ for deportation attitudes). This pattern suggests the typology captures boundary-drawing around marginalized subgroups specifically, not general policy liberalism or Democratic partisanship. See Section A.7 for details.

4.2 Distribution and Agreement

The BCI-based typology produces a more balanced distribution than the original: 29% Individualist, 21% Cosmopolitan, 21% Exclusive, and 29% Expansive (compared to 24/9/26/41, respectively, for the binary linked fate typology). The two typologies agree on 61% of cases, indicating substantial but not complete overlap.

4.3 Results: Construct Validation Confirmed




Figure 3: Study 2: Predicted probability of supporting marginalized subgroups by BCI-based linked fate type ($N=3,102$, multiple imputation). Lower braces show comparisons vs. Individualist (reference); upper brace shows Expansive vs. Exclusive contrast. Pattern replicates Study 1: Exclusive shows no significant boost for Black LG; Expansive shows significantly higher support across all outcomes. See Tables A.19 and A.20 for regression results.

Figure 3 demonstrates that the key findings replicate with the alternative operationalization. As in Study 1, all four types show supermajority support. The critical distinction holds: Expansive types show significantly higher support for all outcomes (all $p < .001$), while Exclusive types show no boost in support for Black LG. This replication with a different operationalization of intragroup consciousness suggests the pattern captures something fundamental about the structure of group solidarity.

5 Study 3: Experimental Evidence

We recruited 1,050 subjects who self-identified as African American via the Qualtrics online panel in March 2018. The study was approved by an Institutional Review Board. The sample is 80% female and was not recruited to be nationally representative. However, successful randomization across treatment conditions

(ANOVA $p > .10$ for all demographic and attitudinal variables) allows credible causal inference within the sample (Table A.21 presents full sample characteristics).

This experiment provides a sharp test of Cohen (1999)’s model of secondary marginalization. Cohen theorized that group members distance themselves from subgroups perceived as threatening the community’s public image—but her evidence was observational. Our survey design randomly assigns stigmatized identity to an otherwise identical candidate, isolating the causal effect of subgroup membership on in-group support.

This design simulates a scenario that occurs regularly in American politics: intra-racial contests, such as a Democratic primary, where Black voters choose among Black candidates. Drawing on data from Shah, Juenke, and Fraga (2022), we calculate such races comprise about 2.7% of state legislative elections, which translates to hundreds of races each election cycle. This within-race, within-party design is essential for detecting the heterogeneity we theorize. Most studies of race and candidate preference compare across racial groups (e.g., Black vs. white candidates) or across parties (e.g., Democratic vs. Republican), designs that are not well suited to detect within-group variation because cross-race and cross-party effects overwhelm any subtler patterns. Black Americans vote approximately 90% Democratic in presidential elections—a rate that leaves little variance to explain with individual-level predictors like linked fate type.

By holding race and party of the candidates constant, our design isolates the effect of subgroup identity on candidate evaluation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in a conjoint-like, forced-choice design following Terkildsen (1993). Both hypothetical Black Democratic candidates share core demographics—middle-aged, male, military veterans—but differ on policy positions. Candidate 1 advocates more liberal, prototypically Black-oriented positions (e.g., criminal justice reform, increased funding for social security and social welfare programs), while Candidate 2 advocates more moderate positions (e.g., concern with the deficit, combating terrorism). In the control condition, both candidates are described as straight and Christian. In treatment conditions, Candidate 1 is described as either Muslim or gay, while all other characteristics remain constant. See Figures A.3–A.5 for full experimental stimuli.³

This design potentially creates cross-pressure between policy alignment and subgroup stigma. If subjects simply vote their policy preferences, the Muslim and gay treatments should have no effect. If subjects penalize

³The survey instrument contained a typographical error describing Candidate 1 as wanting to “reduce the employment rate” rather than “reduce the unemployment rate.” This error appeared identically across all three conditions, so it cannot create spurious treatment effects. A related concern is that subjects biased against the treated identity might nonetheless weight the error more heavily to rationalize defection. However, in open-ended responses fewer than 2% of respondents mentioned the error, distributed evenly across all conditions, with zero gay-condition respondents citing it negatively. See Section A.18 for details.

candidates from marginalized subgroups, we should observe reduced support in the treatment conditions relative to control. And if linked fate increases group cohesion, the penalty should be attenuated among those with high linked fate.

Our primary outcome is binary vote choice (support for Candidate 1 vs. Candidate 2). We also examine whether subjects invoke identity-related keywords (e.g., “Muslim,” “gay,” “Christian”) in open-ended responses explaining their choice, providing behavioral evidence that treatments activated identity-based reasoning (Wasow 2025). Linked fate is measured with the standard item. Ideology is measured on a five-point scale from very liberal to very conservative. Religiosity is measured by asking the extent to which religion shapes political beliefs (1–10 scale). We estimate logistic regressions predicting vote choice, with treatment condition as the key independent variable. To test heterogeneous effects, we interact treatment with linked fate, ideology, and religiosity.

5.1 Treatment Effects on Vote Choice




Figure 4: Study 3: Predicted probability of supporting Candidate 1 (liberal, Black-oriented policies) when randomly varying (A) religion or (B) sexual orientation. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. See Table A.22.

Figure 4 presents the predicted probability of supporting the liberal candidate across experimental conditions. In the control condition, where both candidates are described as straight and Christian, approximately 87% of subjects prefer Candidate 1—the candidate advocating more Black-oriented, liberal policies. Panel A shows that when Candidate 1 is described as Muslim rather than Christian, support drops to approximately 78%—a statistically significant decline of roughly 9 percentage points. Panel B shows a larger effect for

the gay treatment: when Candidate 1 is described as gay, support falls to approximately 70%—a decline of roughly 17 percentage points.

These results indicate that a significant minority of Black voters—between 9 and 17%—vote against the policy-aligned candidate when he is described as belonging to a marginalized subgroup. Notably, this effect size is comparable to the approximately 5–12 percentage point gap in predicted probabilities between Expansive and Exclusive types in the observational data (Studies 1 and 2), providing convergent validity across methods. It is worth noting that even in the treatment conditions, supermajorities (70–78%) still support the liberal candidate, suggesting that policy considerations remain paramount for most voters and that most do not exhibit significant bias. Nevertheless, the 9–17% minority represents a consequential electoral penalty—large enough to be decisive in competitive races. These findings provide experimental support consistent with Cohen’s model of secondary marginalization and results are robust to inclusion of demographic and attitudinal controls (see Table A.22).

5.2 Behavioral Evidence: Open-Ended Responses

Are subjects conscious of identity when evaluating marginalized candidates? If differential treatment reflects active boundary-drawing rather than unconscious bias, subjects should explicitly engage with identity in their reasoning. We examine whether subjects actively invoke identity-related keywords when explaining their candidate choice as a behavioral outcome (Wasow 2025).

Table 2: Proportion of Open-Ended Responses Mentioning Term Categories by Condition

Condition	N	Policy (%)	Race (%)	Religion (%)	Sexuality (%)
Straight Christian	347	19.6	4.6	0.3	0.3
Straight Muslim	355	19.4	5.1	11.8	0.0
Gay Christian	339	19.8	2.4	3.2	10.6

Table 2 presents keyword frequencies across conditions. Policy-related terms (e.g., “healthcare,” “jobs,” “economy”) appear at similar rates across all three conditions, approximately 20%. Race terms (e.g., “Black,” “African American”) similarly show minimal variation, suggesting treatments activated specific identity dimensions rather than general racial salience. Identity-related terms, however, show sharp differences. Religion terms (e.g., “Muslim,” “Christian,” “faith”) jump from just 0.3% in the control condition to 11.8% in the Muslim treatment condition. Sexuality terms (e.g., “gay,” “straight,” “homosexual”) appear in 10.6% of gay treatment responses versus only 0.3% in control.

This behavioral evidence strengthens the interpretation that identity factored into candidate evaluation. Subjects were not simply responding to unconscious bias—they explicitly engaged with identity dimensions when explaining their choices (see also Figure A.6 for model-predicted probabilities). Open-ended responses reveal three identity-related patterns: explicit bias (“I do not support gay people”; “His religion is not my preference”), conflicted support (“I would prefer if the person was a Christian, but I still think what the candidate stands for is better for me”), and identity as asset (“I understand his views and struggle being a gay Black person myself”).

5.3 Does Linked Fate Reduce Bias?

Does linked fate attenuate this within-group bias? If Dawson’s theory is correct, individuals with strong linked fate should be more willing to support candidates from marginalized subgroups. Figure 5 presents the effect of the treatments moderated by linked fate. Consistent with Dawson (1994), linked fate does have a liberalizing main effect: subjects with high linked fate support the liberal candidate at rates approximately 10 percentage points higher than those with low linked fate across all conditions.




Figure 5: Study 3: Predicted probability of supporting Candidate 1 by linked fate. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. High and low linked fate respondents show parallel treatment effects. See Table A.23.

However, contra Dawson’s Black utility heuristic, we find that linked fate does not attenuate bias against Muslim and gay candidates. The slopes in Panels A and B are approximately parallel, indicating that subjects with high and low linked fate show similar treatment effects. The interaction terms in the regression models are not statistically significant (see Table A.23). Consistent with Cohen (1999), the group consciousness that

predicts policy liberalism does not expand the circle of empathy to candidates whose identities are perceived to fall outside traditional community boundaries (Singer 1981).

5.4 Heterogeneous Effects: Ideology and Religiosity

What factors are associated with reduced support for Muslim and gay candidates? Two prominent explanations for negative affect toward Muslims and LGBTQ individuals are political conservatism and strong religious identification (Cohen 1999; Ciftci 2012; Fields 2016). We therefore examine whether ideology and religiosity influence the treatment effects.




Figure 6: Study 3: Predicted probability of supporting Candidate 1 by ideology (conservative vs. non-conservative). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Conservatives show visually larger declines for the gay treatment, but interaction terms do not reach statistical significance. See Table A.25.

Figure 6 shows treatment effects moderated by ideology. For ease of visualization, we dichotomize a five-point ideology scale into conservative and non-conservative (results are similar with a trichotomized version). Panel A shows no meaningful differential anti-Muslim bias among self-identified Black conservatives—the slopes for conservatives and non-conservatives are approximately parallel. Panel B shows a visually striking pattern for the gay treatment: Black conservatives support the liberal candidate at approximately 72% when he is described as straight and Christian, but only 42% when described as gay—a decline of roughly 30 percentage points, considerably larger than among non-conservatives. While this effect is substantively large, however, the interaction terms do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (see Table A.25), meaning we cannot reject that conservatives and non-conservatives respond similarly to treatment. With only 65 self-identified conservatives in the gay condition, estimates at the right of Panel B are imprecise.




Figure 7: Study 3: Predicted probability of supporting Candidate 1 by religiosity. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Higher religiosity amplifies bias against both Muslim and gay candidates. See Table A.24.

In contrast, religiosity significantly amplifies bias in both treatments. Figure 7 shows that subjects who report that religion strongly shapes their political beliefs show substantially larger declines in support for both Muslim and gay candidates. To illustrate: among subjects reporting low religiosity (3 on the 1–10 scale), the Muslim treatment reduces support by 2 percentage points and the gay treatment by 6 percentage points; among highly religious subjects (9 on the scale), the declines are 18 and 27 percentage points, respectively.

This pattern—religiosity mattering more than ideology—echoes the CMPS findings in Studies 1–2, where religiosity was a stronger predictor of secondary marginalization than political conservatism (see Table A.9). Why might this be? The absence of an ideology effect, particularly in the Muslim condition, may reflect several factors. Pew Research finds approximately 20% of American Muslims are of African American ancestry (Mohamed and Diamant 2019; Turner 2004), which may contribute to more positive intergroup contact. Prominent Black leaders such as Muhammad Ali, Malcolm X, and Louis Farrakhan—some of whom are themselves conservative—may attenuate anti-Muslim sentiment across the ideological spectrum. Additionally, Black Americans may interpret ideological labels like “liberal” and “conservative” differently than white Americans (Jefferson 2020).

5.5 Validating the Framework: Three-Way Interaction

Although Study 3 did not include direct measures of cross-group solidarity, we can validate the two-dimensional framework by using religiosity as a proxy for the Expansive–Exclusive distinction. We follow

Cohen (1999), who highlighted the historically prominent role of the Black church in shaping attitudes toward LGBTQ issues. Religiosity is an imperfect proxy—it captures religious commitment beyond group-boundary dispositions, and it correlates with political conservatism—but in Study 1’s pooled CMPS data, higher religiosity predicted lower support for Black LG issues, consistent with the broader literature. Regardless of whether we label this second dimension “religiosity” or “social conservatism,” the core theoretical point is about masked heterogeneity: linked fate alone does not fully explain attitudes toward marginalized subgroups.

We create a four-type typology by crossing linked fate (high/low) with religiosity (high/low, median split).

If religiosity proxies for exclusive orientation, we would expect: (1) High LF + Low Religiosity respondents to show minimal treatment effects (analogous to “Expansive” from Study 1), and (2) High LF + High Religiosity respondents to show substantial treatment effects (analogous to “Exclusive”). Figure 8 reveals the predicted pattern for both the Muslim and gay treatments. Among high linked fate respondents, those with low religiosity (Expansive) show a treatment effect of only 3.8 percentage points for the gay treatment—not significantly different from zero. In contrast, high linked fate respondents with high religiosity (Exclusive) show a treatment effect of 27.5 percentage points, the largest of any group. The 23.7 percentage point difference between these two high-LF groups is statistically significant ($p = 0.05$, Tukey-adjusted). See Table A.28 for exact percentages and Section A.15 for formal interaction tests.

6 Discussion

6.1 Synthesis Across Studies

First, Studies 1, 2, and 3 tell a coherent story that partially reconciles the findings of Dawson (1994) and Cohen (1999). Our evidence corroborates Dawson’s argument that linked fate predicts liberal policy attitudes and pro-group political orientation. The observational and experimental results are also consistent with Cohen’s argument that group solidarity does not automatically extend to marginalized subgroups. The resolution is that *different types* of linked fate can produce these distinct patterns.

Second, secondary marginalization exists at scale. A substantial minority of Black Americans (roughly one-quarter) express lower support for Black LG, Muslim, and other marginalized subgroup members. This is not a fringe phenomenon but a significant feature of Black public opinion.




Figure 8: Study 3: Support for Candidate 1 by Linked Fate and Religiosity Type for Muslim (A) and Gay (B) Treatments. High LF respondents with low religiosity (putatively Expansive) show minimal treatment effects, while High LF respondents with high religiosity (putatively Exclusive) show the largest reduction in support. Bars show sample proportions; error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Brackets show within-group treatment effect significance: n.s. = not significant, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. See Section A.17 for robustness with controls and Table A.28 for exact percentages.

Third, just as the Black community is not a monolith, neither is linked fate. The standard linked fate measure collapses two different orientations with distinct implications for political coalitions. “Expansive” linked fate—combining intragroup solidarity with cross-group solidarity—does predict a sense of commonality with marginalized subgroups. “Exclusive” linked fate—intragroup solidarity without cross-group connection—shows no boost for LG support but does provide modest support for Muslim candidates. Consistent with this differential pattern, when asked about linked fate with LGBTQ people, Exclusive types report significantly lower levels than Expansive types (mean = 1.83 vs. 2.44 on a 1–4 scale, $p < .001$), with 48% of Exclusive respondents at the lowest level compared to 25% of Expansive respondents. Importantly, this comparison uses a typology constructed without LGBTQ linked fate, avoiding circularity (see Table A.15). No equivalent Muslim linked fate item exists in the CMPS, precluding a parallel analysis. Whether cross-group empathy is necessary for extending solidarity to subgroups perceived as most distant—while intragroup solidarity alone suffices for closer groups—is a question our data raise but cannot resolve.

Fourth, the framework reconciles a recurring puzzle in the literature: linked fate predicts inclusive *attitudes* toward marginalized subgroups, yet prior research often finds it fails to predict inclusive *behavior* when Black leaders and voters face actual choices. Our findings suggest this is not a contradiction between experimental and observational methods but a problem of both measurement and theory. The standard linked fate measure

aggregates Expansive respondents (approximately 40%, who drive the attitudinal effects) with Exclusive respondents (approximately 26%, who show no additional support for LG outcomes and only modest effects for Muslims). Because these types are indistinguishable with a single item, the standard measure predicts what people *say* but not what a sizable bloc *does*.

Fifth, though absolute differences between Expansive and Exclusive types in the observational data are modest, this plausibly reflects ceiling effects. The supermajority support (70–85%) across all groups leaves limited room for differentiation. Our key finding is not that Expansive types are dramatically more supportive, but that Exclusive linked fate provides *no additional boost* for LG support despite high intragroup solidarity. On LG issues, high-linked-fate Exclusive types are statistically indistinguishable from low-linked-fate Individualists. For Muslim candidates, Exclusive types do show modest inclusion, consistent with bounded solidarity. To contextualize these effect sizes: voter-mobilization field experiments typically find intent-to-treat effects measured in fractions of a percentage point (Green, McGrath, and Aronow 2013). By this benchmark, the subgroup-identity penalties we estimate (9–17pp experimentally) and Expansive–Exclusive gaps (5–12pp observationally) are substantial. Moreover, our experiment models a low-information primary-like contest where partisan cues are held constant and therefore cannot be used to distinguish candidates, amplifying the weight of other signals like identity cues. In such settings, 5–15 point shifts can be decisive.

Finally, religiosity is a key moderator. Across all three studies, religiosity consistently amplifies secondary marginalization. Highly religious Black Americans show lower support for LG subgroups (Studies 1 and 2) and are more likely to vote against Muslim and gay candidates (Study 3). This pattern is consistent with the Black church’s dual role as a source of political mobilization and a site where community boundaries are enforced. Importantly, the mechanism appears to be how religion translates into political attitudes rather than religious practice itself: general religiosity shows weaker or null effects in the CMPS observational models (Studies 1 and 2), while Study 3’s measure of whether religion shapes political beliefs is a significant factor.

6.2 Theoretical Implications

Our findings align with White and Laird (2020)’s critique of linked fate while offering a complementary explanation. White and Laird argue that linked fate is insufficient to explain Black political unity because social constraint, not psychological identification, drives political conformity. Our findings support their skepticism about linked fate’s explanatory power but suggest the concept can be refined through reconceptualization.

By distinguishing Expansive from Exclusive orientations, our results suggest that linked fate operates less like a single construct and more like a family of orientations with distinct political implications. The problem is both conceptual—the standard framework treats linked fate as unidimensional—and methodological, a binary single-item measure cannot capture this complexity.

This framework connects to broader literatures on parochial altruism (Kustov 2021), intersectional solidarity (Crowder 2022), and minority linked fate (Gershon et al. 2019). Our contribution is in showing that these dynamics operate *within* groups, not just between them, and in offering both a model and means of measurement. Though we focus on Black Americans, similar four-type structures should emerge in any group where identity is valued and boundaries are contested—from religious communities to ethnic minorities to professional associations. Exclusive linked fate represents a form of “bounded solidarity” that extends benefits selectively. Expansive linked fate, by contrast, represents a form of group consciousness that is simultaneously particularist (connected to one’s own group) and cosmopolitan (extending solidarity to other marginalized groups).

These findings have implications for Black political representation. Cohen (1999)’s model emphasizes that Black *leaders*—not just voters—occupy gatekeeping positions that shape which candidates and subcommunities receive endorsements, resources, and institutional support. When an Exclusive type holds such a position, the population-level average is cold comfort to the marginalized person who faces exclusion rather than support. If community leadership disproportionately skews Exclusive, even a minority orientation can have outsized influence on which individuals and groups gain access to political resources.

The effects we observe are large enough to matter in competitive settings. Identity-based penalties of 9–17 percentage points (experimental) and Expansive–Exclusive gaps of 5–12 percentage points (observational) can be decisive in intra-racial primaries and other contests where margins are slim. African American Muslim and LGBTQ candidates may face significant headwinds even in majority-Black constituencies.

Religiosity compounds these dynamics. The Black church remains central to Black political life, and our findings suggest highly religious voters—a crucial constituency—are more likely to hold Exclusive orientations. The qualitative responses in Study 3 suggest the resulting tension is real but not insurmountable, with some voters expressing conflicted but ultimately supportive positions.

6.3 Limitations and Future Directions

Several limitations suggest directions for future research. First, our data are now 8–10 years old (CMPS 2016, experiment 2018); attitudes toward Muslim and LGBTQ individuals may have shifted. GSS data show a long-term decline in opposition to same-sex relations through 2022, though the 2024 GSS suggests possible reversal among all respondents (with approximately 45% of African Americans saying “always wrong”). Second, our experimental sample is non-representative (predominantly female, online panel), and our candidates are hypothetical. While random assignment supports causal inference, external validity to real-world elections is uncertain. Future work should examine actual electoral behavior in races featuring Muslim and LGBTQ candidates.

Third, while we develop continuous measures of cross-group solidarity (the cross-group linked fate index and the Black Consciousness Index), our typology and experimental moderation analyses rely on dichotomized high/low splits. Future research should further develop and validate continuous measures of both intragroup and cross-group linked fate, perhaps building on Kim and Yan (2021)’s distinction between “linked hurt” and “linked progress.”

Fourth, with multiple outcomes and subgroup comparisons, multiple comparison concerns arise. To address this, we apply Bonferroni correction to the theoretically-motivated Expansive vs. Exclusive contrasts across the three outcomes; all contrasts survive the adjusted threshold ($p < .017$) in both Study 1 and Study 2 (see Tables A.11 and A.20). The pattern also replicates across two independent operationalizations—the binary linked fate typology (Study 1) and the multi-item Black Consciousness Index (Study 2)—providing convergent validity unlikely to arise from chance.

Finally, our two-dimensional framework, while theoretically grounded and empirically supported, would benefit from validation with purpose-built measures. Future research should develop validated multi-item scales designed specifically to capture the expansive-exclusive distinction.

7 Conclusion

The Expansive-Exclusive typology we propose is an initial effort to disaggregate linked fate, not a complete taxonomy. Our two-dimensional framework captures one axis of variation—whether solidarity extends across subgroup boundaries—but other dimensions likely matter as well. Future work might examine how linked fate varies across targets of exclusion (sexuality, religion, immigration status), whether the boundaries shift

in response to political context or threat, and how similar dynamics operate in other racial and ethnic communities with strong group consciousness. The broader contribution is demonstrating that linked fate is not monolithic: individuals who score identically on the standard measure may hold distinctly different orientations toward who belongs in the group. The standard measure also faces a methodological limitation: when two-thirds to three-quarters of Black respondents affirm linked fate, the measure has limited variance for explaining heterogeneity in political attitudes. Disaggregating linked fate—whether into “linked hurt” versus “linked progress” as Kim and Yan (2021) propose, or into Expansive versus Exclusive orientations as we do here—may prove more productive than continuing to treat it as a single dimension.

Even within communities that prize solidarity and equality, not all members are included equally. Linked fate shapes what Black voters want from politics but does not necessarily bridge the boundaries of Blackness that Cohen identified a quarter century ago. Understanding its varieties—particularly expansive and exclusive—remains important for both scholarship and practice. As Cohen and Brubaker remind us, group membership is less a settled fact than a contested project—a negotiation sharpest among those who most strongly affirm their linked fate, yet disagree on who belongs.

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A Appendix

Contents

A.1	GSS: Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Relations, 1973–2024	1
A.2	Study 1: Sample Characteristics and LF-Type Distribution	1
A.3	Study 1: Variable Definitions	4
A.4	Study 1: Missing Data	4
A.5	Study 1: Regression Tables	4
A.6	Study 1: LGBTQ Linked Fate by LF Type	4
A.7	Study 1: Discriminant Validity	5
A.8	Study 1: Robustness to Respectability Politics	7
A.9	Study 2: Black Consciousness Index Construction	10
A.10	Study 2: BCI-Based Typology Regression Tables	11
A.11	Study 3: Sample Characteristics	12
A.12	Study 3: Experimental Manipulations	13
A.13	Study 3: Regression Tables	14
A.14	Study 3: Keyword Analysis Methodology	17
A.15	Study 3: Treatment × LF-Religiosity Type Interaction	19
A.16	Study 3: Treatment Effects by Linked Fate and Religiosity Type	19
A.17	Study 3: LF × Religiosity Type with Controls	19
A.18	Study 3: Survey Instrument Typo Analysis	21

A.1 GSS: Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Relations, 1973–2024




Figure A.1: GSS question: 'What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?' Percent responding 'Always Wrong' shown. Weighting uses WTSSPS for all years.

A.2 Study 1: Sample Characteristics and LF-Type Distribution

Table A.1: Distribution of Linked Fate Types Among Black Americans (CMPS)

Type	Description	<i>N</i>	Weighted % (SE)
Individualist	Low in-group LF, Low cross-group LF	745	25.8% (1.1)
Cosmopolitan	Low in-group LF, High cross-group LF	277	8.7% (0.6)
Exclusive	High in-group LF, Low cross-group LF	800	25.8% (1)
Expansive	High in-group LF, High cross-group LF	1280	39.8% (1.1)

Note:

Weighted to match 2015 ACS demographics for Black Americans. In-group LF = standard linked fate measure. Cross-group LF = mean of LGBT, immigrant, and racial minority LF items.

Table A.2: Demographic and Attitudinal Profile by Linked Fate Type

Characteristic	Individualist	Cosmopolitan	Exclusive	Expansive	<i>p</i>
<i>N</i>	745	277	800	1280	
Demographics					
% Female	54.9 [50, 60]	57.3 [50, 64]	51.2 [47, 55]	52.7 [49, 56]	0.49
Mean Age	43.2 [42, 45]	41.8 [40, 44]	44.5 [43, 46]	43.0 [42, 44]	0.18
Mean Income (\$1K)	44.1 [39, 49]	45.6 [39, 52]	45.1 [42, 48]	49.1 [46, 52]	0.19
% College Degree	14.2 [12, 17]	19.5 [15, 24]	18.5 [16, 21]	24.7 [22, 27]	<.001
Political					
% Democrat	65.4 [61, 70]	64.0 [57, 71]	69.0 [65, 73]	72.4 [69, 76]	0.03
% Conservative	17.8 [14, 21]	24.4 [18, 31]	14.5 [11, 18]	13.9 [11, 16]	0.004
Religion & Contact					
% High Religiosity	47.8 [42, 53]	45.6 [38, 54]	44.4 [40, 49]	48.2 [44, 52]	0.65
% Know LGBTQ Person	67.8 [63, 72]	69.4 [63, 76]	72.0 [68, 76]	77.9 [75, 81]	<.001
Respectability					
% Two-Parent Emphasis	19.9 [15, 24]	24.3 [18, 30]	15.1 [12, 18]	21.1 [17, 25]	0.04
Mean Accepts Profiling (1–4)	1.9 [2, 2]	2.1 [2, 2]	1.8 [2, 2]	1.8 [2, 2]	0.01
Mean Indiv. Attribution (–3–3)	-0.1 [-0, -0]	-0.2 [-0, -0]	-0.4 [-0, -0]	-0.4 [-0, -0]	<.001
Outcomes					
% Support Black LG	67.7 [63, 72]	76.0 [70, 82]	71.1 [67, 75]	82.2 [79, 85]	<.001
% Vote Muslim Man	65.1 [61, 70]	72.7 [67, 79]	73.4 [70, 77]	79.8 [77, 83]	<.001
% Vote Muslim Woman	67.9 [63, 73]	75.6 [70, 81]	74.6 [71, 78]	84.1 [82, 87]	<.001

Note:

CMPS 2016. Weighted to match 2015 ACS demographics for Black Americans. *N* is unweighted sample size. Cells show weighted estimates with 95% confidence intervals. *p*-values from survey-weighted chi-square tests (binary variables) or Wald tests (continuous). Democrat = self-identified Democrat. Conservative = self-reported conservative ideology. College Degree = bachelor’s degree or higher. High Religiosity = attends religious services at least weekly. Income = household income in thousands of dollars. Two-Parent Emphasis = agrees that Black families would be better off if more Black children were raised in two-parent homes. Accepts Profiling = acceptance of racial profiling by police (1–4 scale, higher = more accepting). Indiv. Attribution = net individualist attribution for Black disadvantage (structural minus individualist factors, negative = more structural). Support Black LG = “somewhat” or “very important” for Blacks to address challenges of Black gays and lesbians. Vote Muslim = would vote for Muslim American candidate for Congress.

Table A.3: Demographic and Attitudinal Profile by BCI Type

Characteristic	Individualist	Cosmopolitan	Exclusive	Expansive	<i>p</i>
<i>N</i>	899	650	646	907	
Demographics					
% Female	53.3 [49, 58]	53.9 [49, 59]	52.8 [48, 58]	53.2 [49, 58]	0.99
Mean Age	44.1 [43, 46]	44.7 [43, 46]	43.5 [42, 45]	41.2 [40, 43]	0.005
Mean Income (\$1K)	44.2 [40, 48]	47.7 [44, 52]	45.2 [41, 49]	49.0 [46, 52]	0.27
% College Degree	16.6 [14, 19]	22.6 [19, 26]	16.1 [13, 19]	24.7 [22, 28]	<.001
Political					
% Democrat	63.2 [59, 67]	64.2 [60, 69]	73.1 [69, 78]	76.1 [72, 80]	<.001
% Conservative	18.6 [15, 22]	21.0 [17, 25]	12.5 [9, 16]	11.8 [9, 15]	<.001
Religion & Contact					
% High Religiosity	45.5 [41, 50]	45.3 [40, 51]	46.7 [41, 52]	49.6 [45, 55]	0.58
% Know LGBTQ Person	65.5 [62, 69]	72.9 [68, 77]	76.4 [72, 80]	79.1 [76, 83]	<.001
Respectability					
% Two-Parent Emphasis	17.6 [14, 21]	19.3 [15, 24]	17.4 [13, 22]	23.5 [19, 28]	0.13
Mean Accepts Profiling (1–4)	1.9 [2, 2]	1.8 [2, 2]	1.7 [2, 2]	1.9 [2, 2]	0.05
Mean Indiv. Attribution (–3–3)	-0.2 [-0, -0]	-0.3 [-0, -0]	-0.3 [-0, -0]	-0.4 [-1, -0]	<.001
Outcomes					
% Support Black LG	66.0 [62, 70]	79.4 [75, 84]	74.3 [70, 78]	82.4 [79, 86]	<.001
% Vote Muslim Man	66.3 [62, 70]	75.8 [72, 80]	73.7 [70, 78]	80.6 [77, 84]	<.001
% Vote Muslim Woman	68.5 [64, 73]	80.9 [77, 84]	75.2 [71, 79]	83.9 [81, 87]	<.001

Note:

CMPS 2016. Weighted to match 2015 ACS demographics for Black Americans. *N* is unweighted sample size. Cells show weighted estimates with 95% confidence intervals. *p*-values from survey-weighted chi-square tests (binary variables) or Wald tests (continuous). College Degree = bachelor’s degree or higher. Types constructed by crossing the Black Consciousness Index (BCI, median split) with cross-group linked fate (median split). See Table A.2 for variable definitions and the parallel table using binary linked fate.

Table A.4: Support for Marginalized Subgroups by Linked Fate Type (Multiple Imputation, *N* = 3,102)

Linked Fate Type	<i>N</i>	Support Black LG	Vote Muslim Man	Vote Muslim Woman
Individualist	745	68.9%	64.2%	68.7%
Cosmopolitan	277	76.2%	70.0%	74.7%
Exclusive	800	70.2%	70.9%	74.3%
Expansive	1280	84.0%	77.2%	82.5%

A.3 Study 1: Variable Definitions

Table A.5 presents the CMPS variable codes and question wording for key measures used in Study 1. For logistic regression analyses, the 1–3 support scales are dichotomized as 1 = “somewhat” or “very important” versus 0 = “not important at all.”

Table A.5: CMPS Variable Definitions

Variable	Code	Question Wording	Scale
<i>Linked Fate</i>			
Intragroup linked fate	C150	Do you think what happens generally to [Black] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
<i>Cross-Group Linked Fate</i>			
LGBTQ linked fate	C240	Do you think what happens to LGBTQ people will have something to do with what happens in your life?	1–4 (low–high)
Immigrant linked fate	BLA190	Do you think what happens to immigrants in this country will affect what happens in your life?	1–4 (low–high)
Minority linked fate	BLA191	Do you think what happens to other racial/ethnic minorities will affect what happens in your life?	1–4 (low–high)
<i>Support for Marginalized Subgroups</i>			
Black gays/lesbians	B183	How important is it for Blacks to address the challenges faced by Black gays and lesbians?	1–3 (Not–Very)
Black transgender	B184	...faced by Black transgender people?	1–3
Black women	B185	...faced by Black women?	1–3
Black immigrants	B186	...faced by Black undocumented immigrants?	1–3
Formerly incarcerated	B187	...faced by formerly incarcerated Black people?	1–3
<i>Muslim Candidate Support</i>			
Muslim man	BL95	Would you vote for a Muslim American man for Congress?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
Muslim woman	BL96	Would you vote for a Muslim American woman for Congress?	0 = No, 1 = Yes

A.4 Study 1: Missing Data

Multiple imputation uses $N=3,102$ respondents; listwise deletion would reduce the analytic sample to $N = 2,166$, a loss of 936 cases (30%). Figure A.2 shows the source of this case loss: missingness is concentrated in just two variables—religious attendance (`high_relig`, 746 missing) and political ideology (`ideology_num`, 356 missing). All other analysis variables have negligible missingness (0–3 cases).

This pattern reflects standard item non-response on sensitive political items (“don’t know” or refused), not a survey skip pattern or design issue. Multiple imputation is well-suited for this type of missingness, as it assumes data are missing at random (MAR) conditional on observed variables (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011).

A.5 Study 1: Regression Tables

The “Excludes LGBTQ LF” column uses a cross-group index that omits LGBTQ linked fate to avoid endogeneity concerns. Results are substantively similar across both specifications.

BCI = Black Consciousness Index. LF = standard linked fate measure. Both are individually significant predictors (Columns 1–2). Without respectability controls (Column 3), both remain significant; with controls (Column 4), LF remains statistically significant while BCI is attenuated, suggesting substantial overlap between the measures.

A.6 Study 1: LGBTQ Linked Fate by LF Type

Table A.15 shows mean LGBTQ linked fate (C240) by linked fate type. To avoid circularity, this analysis uses a typology constructed *without* LGBTQ linked fate—the cross-group dimension is based only on




Figure A.2: Missingness is concentrated in two variables: religious attendance and political ideology. All other analysis variables have near-zero missingness.

Table A.6: Effect of Linked Fate on Support for Black Subgroups and Muslim Candidates (Multiple Imputation, $N = 3,102$)

Variable	Gays/Lesbians	Trans	Women	Immig	Incar	Muslim Man	Muslim Woman
Linked Fate (High)	0.278* (0.091)	0.349* (0.089)	0.568* (0.211)	0.411* (0.123)	0.632* (0.184)	0.313* (0.087)	0.332* (0.091)
Age (years)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.010 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	0.006 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Female	0.079 (0.096)	0.278* (0.093)	0.523* (0.219)	0.147 (0.130)	0.076 (0.200)	-0.632* (0.097)	-0.284* (0.100)
Education	0.143* (0.046)	0.045 (0.045)	0.307* (0.107)	-0.034 (0.062)	0.179 (0.095)	0.087* (0.043)	0.165* (0.046)
Income (1K)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Moderate	-0.361* (0.110)	-0.374* (0.106)	0.369 (0.284)	-0.094 (0.154)	-0.105 (0.245)	-0.212 (0.107)	-0.254* (0.117)
Conservative	-0.742* (0.153)	-0.802* (0.129)	0.186 (0.358)	-0.623* (0.189)	-0.115 (0.285)	-0.453* (0.130)	-0.496* (0.148)
Republican	-0.221 (0.202)	-0.317 (0.196)	-0.147 (0.438)	-0.546* (0.238)	-0.363 (0.359)	-0.209 (0.198)	-0.436* (0.199)
Independent	-0.287* (0.108)	-0.193 (0.106)	-0.293 (0.263)	0.022 (0.153)	-0.064 (0.236)	-0.322* (0.103)	-0.313* (0.109)
Other Party	-0.289 (0.182)	-0.298 (0.179)	-1.113* (0.338)	-0.118 (0.243)	-0.845* (0.300)	-0.819* (0.165)	-1.039* (0.168)
High Religiosity	-0.181 (0.107)	-0.187* (0.092)	-0.773* (0.292)	0.068 (0.146)	-0.239 (0.260)	-0.008 (0.097)	-0.126 (0.103)
Knows LGBTQ Person	0.478* (0.097)	0.413* (0.095)	0.230 (0.222)	0.016 (0.136)	0.088 (0.200)		
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.556* (0.111)	-0.364* (0.111)	-0.130 (0.247)	-0.388* (0.150)	-0.243 (0.220)	-0.401* (0.110)	-0.402* (0.113)
Accepts Profiling	-0.068 (0.044)	-0.061 (0.043)	-0.239* (0.097)	-0.084 (0.060)	-0.308* (0.086)	-0.044 (0.042)	-0.112* (0.044)
Individualist Attribution	0.036 (0.061)	0.008 (0.059)	-0.243 (0.156)	0.099 (0.080)	-0.091 (0.133)	-0.120* (0.058)	-0.128* (0.063)
Constant	0.955* (0.259)	1.023* (0.254)	1.869* (0.592)	2.241* (0.354)	2.472* (0.533)	0.985* (0.241)	0.964* (0.253)

Note: * $p < .05$. Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Muslim candidate models exclude ‘Knows LGBTQ Person’ control.

immigrant linked fate (BLA190) and racial minority linked fate (BLA191). Exclusive types report significantly lower LGBTQ linked fate than Expansive types (1.83 vs. 2.44, $p < .001$), supporting the social distance interpretation.

A.7 Study 1: Discriminant Validity

If the typology captures boundary-drawing around marginalized subgroups specifically—rather than general political liberalism—it should predict attitudes toward marginalized subgroups but *not* general policy attitudes or partisan behavior. We test this with two sets of outcomes.

Immigration Policy Attitudes. We test whether the typology predicts general immigration policy attitudes (opposition to deporting undocumented immigrants, BLA205; rejecting the “immigrants take jobs” framing, BLA207). These differ conceptually from the marginalized subgroup outcomes: they measure policy attitudes, not normative priorities about who belongs in the Black community’s coalition. The typology shows no significant effect on deportation attitudes (Expansive vs. Exclusive $p = .74$). The effect on the “take jobs” framing is suggestive but not significant ($p = .06$). This pattern suggests the typology captures attitudes specifically toward marginalized subgroups rather than general pro-immigrant sentiment.

Table A.7: Effect of Linked Fate Types on Support for Black Subgroups (Multiple Imputation, $N = 3,102$)

Variable	Gays/Lesbians	Trans	Women	Immig	Incar
LF Type: Cosmopolitan	0.409* (0.168)	0.388* (0.163)	0.082 (0.342)	0.598* (0.231)	0.195 (0.298)
LF Type: Exclusive	-0.005 (0.115)	0.063 (0.113)	0.628* (0.288)	0.311* (0.153)	0.546* (0.241)
LF Type: Expansive	0.724* (0.115)	0.788* (0.113)	0.569* (0.261)	0.792* (0.154)	0.811* (0.235)
Age (years)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.009 (0.007)	0.003 (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)
Female	0.061 (0.097)	0.259* (0.094)	0.533* (0.215)	0.112 (0.130)	0.036 (0.199)
Education	0.106* (0.044)	0.005 (0.043)	0.306* (0.104)	-0.050 (0.058)	0.206* (0.090)
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.246* (0.043)	-0.261* (0.042)	0.114 (0.105)	-0.137* (0.058)	-0.011 (0.088)
Party: Republican	-0.225 (0.202)	-0.329 (0.197)	-0.229 (0.433)	-0.640* (0.236)	-0.370 (0.355)
Party: Independent	-0.269* (0.108)	-0.176 (0.107)	-0.327 (0.260)	0.012 (0.153)	-0.068 (0.235)
Party: Other	-0.276 (0.181)	-0.294 (0.177)	-1.170* (0.326)	-0.167 (0.240)	-0.859* (0.296)
High Religiosity	-0.180 (0.112)	-0.175 (0.103)	-0.855* (0.240)	0.051 (0.145)	-0.180 (0.234)
Knows LGBTQ Person	0.438* (0.097)	0.373* (0.095)	0.214 (0.221)	-0.026 (0.136)	0.094 (0.199)
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.607* (0.112)	-0.410* (0.112)	-0.141 (0.247)	-0.424* (0.150)	-0.246 (0.219)
Accepts Profiling	-0.082 (0.045)	-0.075 (0.044)	-0.248* (0.098)	-0.102 (0.060)	-0.317* (0.086)
Individualist Attribution	0.050 (0.061)	0.021 (0.060)	-0.243 (0.157)	0.108 (0.081)	-0.093 (0.133)
Constant	1.362* (0.274)	1.472* (0.270)	1.857* (0.616)	2.477* (0.372)	2.386* (0.553)

Note: * $p < .05$. Logistic regression coefficients (SE). Reference: Individualist.

Table A.8: Effect of BCI-Based Linked Fate Types on Support for Black Subgroups (Multiple Imputation, $N = 3,102$)

Variable	Gays/Lesbians	Trans	Women	Immig	Incar
BCI Type: Cosmopolitan	0.607* (0.125)	0.618* (0.122)	0.357 (0.276)	0.683* (0.170)	0.307 (0.233)
BCI Type: Exclusive	0.090 (0.118)	0.108 (0.116)	0.978* (0.352)	0.429* (0.164)	0.674* (0.272)
BCI Type: Expansive	0.785* (0.124)	0.807* (0.121)	0.554 (0.284)	0.836* (0.167)	1.000* (0.274)
Age (years)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.010 (0.007)	0.004 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)
Female	0.062 (0.096)	0.258* (0.093)	0.523* (0.215)	0.099 (0.129)	0.021 (0.198)
Education	0.105* (0.044)	0.005 (0.043)	0.320* (0.102)	-0.049 (0.058)	0.210* (0.089)
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.242* (0.046)	-0.262* (0.043)	0.121 (0.113)	-0.138* (0.062)	0.009 (0.100)
Party: Republican	-0.215 (0.202)	-0.318 (0.197)	-0.245 (0.432)	-0.626* (0.236)	-0.380 (0.356)
Party: Independent	-0.258* (0.110)	-0.163 (0.108)	-0.281 (0.263)	0.043 (0.154)	-0.011 (0.237)
Party: Other	-0.265 (0.181)	-0.282 (0.177)	-1.023* (0.332)	-0.097 (0.241)	-0.696* (0.300)
High Religiosity	-0.172 (0.109)	-0.178 (0.109)	-0.869* (0.287)	0.047 (0.129)	-0.125 (0.224)
Knows LGBTQ Person	0.429* (0.097)	0.368* (0.096)	0.196 (0.221)	-0.046 (0.136)	0.068 (0.199)
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.615* (0.112)	-0.419* (0.112)	-0.149 (0.248)	-0.442* (0.150)	-0.292 (0.220)
Accepts Profiling	-0.087 (0.045)	-0.079 (0.044)	-0.236* (0.099)	-0.097 (0.061)	-0.317* (0.087)
Individualist Attribution	0.051 (0.061)	0.020 (0.060)	-0.244 (0.156)	0.108 (0.081)	-0.088 (0.134)
Constant	1.300* (0.276)	1.431* (0.270)	1.710* (0.623)	2.422* (0.377)	2.287* (0.566)

Note: * $p < .05$. Logistic regression coefficients (SE). Reference: Individualist.

Political Outcomes. We test whether the typology predicts explicitly political outcomes: presidential vote choice (Clinton vs. Trump), congressional vote choice (Democratic vs. Republican), and party identification (Democrat vs. other). Black Americans voted overwhelmingly for Clinton (92% among major-party voters) and Democratic congressional candidates (91%), creating severe ceiling effects. Nevertheless, if the typology captured general political liberalism, we would expect *some* predictive power even with these constrained distributions. Instead, the typology shows no significant effects on any political outcome after controlling for ideology (all Expansive vs. Exclusive contrasts $p > .6$). Table A.16 summarizes these results.

The pattern is clear: the typology strongly predicts attitudes toward marginalized subgroups (LG $p < .001$, Muslim $p < .05$) but shows no predictive power for political outcomes ($p > .6$ for all three). Immigration attitudes fall in between, with null effects on deportation and a marginal effect on the “take jobs” framing.

Table A.9: Predictors of Secondary Marginalization: Who Says Addressing Black LG Challenges is ‘Not Important’?

Predictor	OR	95% CI	p
Age (per year)	1.00	[1.00, 1.01]	0.337
Female	0.87	[0.69, 1.09]	0.219
Education	0.85	[0.76, 0.96]	0.006
Conservative (vs. Liberal)	2.06	[1.52, 2.78]	<.001
High Religiosity	1.22	[0.99, 1.52]	0.067
Knows LGBTQ Person	0.63	[0.50, 0.80]	<.001
High Linked Fate	0.70	[0.56, 0.87]	0.002
Two-Parent Emphasis	1.62	[1.23, 2.12]	<.001
Accepts Profiling	1.08	[0.97, 1.20]	0.154
Indiv. Attribution	0.96	[0.84, 1.11]	0.614

Note:

Logistic regression predicting ‘Not Important at All’ response ($N=3,102$). OR = Odds Ratio. Reference categories: Moderate/Liberal (ideology), Low Religiosity, Low Linked Fate.

Table A.10: Linked Fate Types and Support for Marginalized Groups (Multiple Imputation, $N=3,102$)

Variable	LG Support		Muslim Man		Muslim Woman	
	Coef	p	Coef	p	Coef	p
(Intercept)	1.36	<.001	1.11	<.001	1.02	<.001
Cosmopolitan	0.41	<.05	0.33	<.05	0.38	<.05
Exclusive	-0.01	0.95	0.23	<.05	0.19	0.1
Expansive	0.72	<.001	0.54	<.001	0.63	<.001
Age	0.00	0.29	0.01	<.05	0.00	0.14
Female	0.06	0.56	-0.67	<.001	-0.32	<.01
Education	0.10	<.05	0.09	<.05	0.17	<.001
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.25	<.001	-0.13	<.01	-0.12	<.01
Democrat	-0.22	0.28	-0.23	0.25	-0.46	<.05
High Religiosity	-0.27	<.05	-0.31	<.01	-0.31	<.01
Knows LGBTQ	-0.27	0.14	NA	NA	NA	NA
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.15	0.11	-0.85	<.001	-1.08	<.001
Accepts Profiling	0.43	<.001	0.09	0.34	-0.04	0.65
Indiv. Attribution	-0.61	<.001	-0.42	<.001	-0.43	<.001

Note:

Reference category: Individualist. Muslim models exclude ‘Knows LGBTQ’ control.

This supports the interpretation that the typology captures something specific about boundary-drawing around who belongs in the Black community’s coalition—not general political liberalism or Democratic partisanship.

A.8 Study 1: Robustness to Respectability Politics

Bunyasi and Smith (2019) argue that respectability politics—endorsement of traditional family structures and acceptance of racial profiling—serves as a “countervailing force” that limits linked fate’s capacity to generate support for marginalized subgroups. We propose instead that cross-group solidarity constitutes a second dimension of linked fate itself, producing qualitatively distinct types. If this is correct, the Expansive-Exclusive distinction should persist after controlling for respectability politics.

Table A.11: Study 1: Expansive vs. Exclusive Linked Fate Type Contrasts

Outcome	Difference	SE	z	p	Bonf.
Support Black LG	0.735	0.112	6.55	<.001	Yes
Vote Muslim Man	0.323	0.105	3.06	0.002	Yes
Vote Muslim Woman	0.464	0.112	4.14	<.001	Yes

Note:

Difference = Expansive coefficient minus Exclusive coefficient (log-odds scale). Positive values indicate Expansive types are more supportive than Exclusive types. Bonf. = survives Bonferroni correction for 3 comparisons ($p < .017$).

Table A.12: Robustness Check: Cross-Group Index With and Without LGBTQ Linked Fate (MI, $N = 3,102$)

	Full Index	Excludes LGBTQ LF
LF Type: Cosmopolitan	0.402* (0.168)	0.024 (0.171)
LF Type: Exclusive	-0.007 (0.115)	0.128 (0.131)
LF Type: Expansive	0.723* (0.115)	0.388* (0.115)
Age (years)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Female	0.054 (0.096)	0.065 (0.096)
Education	0.101* (0.044)	0.121* (0.043)
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.253* (0.046)	-0.264* (0.045)
Democrat		
High Religiosity	-0.134 (0.109)	-0.146 (0.109)
Knows LGBTQ Person	0.433* (0.097)	0.476* (0.096)
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.614* (0.112)	-0.576* (0.111)
Accepts Profiling	-0.084 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.044)
Indiv. Attribution	0.050 (0.061)	0.041 (0.061)
Constant	1.394* (0.280)	1.405* (0.278)

Reference category: Individualist. * $p < .05$

Table A.13: Linked Fate Types and Muslim Candidate Support (MI, $N = 3,102$)

	Vote Muslim Man	Vote Muslim Woman
LF Type: Cosmopolitan	0.327* (0.157)	0.376* (0.166)
LF Type: Exclusive	0.233* (0.113)	0.193 (0.117)
LF Type: Expansive	0.538* (0.106)	0.634* (0.113)
Age (years)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
Female	-0.668* (0.097)	-0.320* (0.100)
Education	0.089* (0.041)	0.168* (0.043)
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.134* (0.043)	-0.120* (0.044)
Democrat		
High Religiosity	0.089 (0.093)	-0.045 (0.099)
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.422* (0.110)	-0.428* (0.114)
Accepts Profiling	-0.054 (0.042)	-0.123* (0.044)
Indiv. Attribution	-0.121* (0.058)	-0.132* (0.063)
Constant	1.108* (0.255)	1.021* (0.266)

Reference category: Individualist. * $p < .05$

Using the same CMPS data, we operationalize respectability following Bunyasi and Smith: (1) belief that “Blacks should focus on making sure families have two parents” versus supporting all families regardless

Table A.14: Black Consciousness Index and LG Support (MI, $N = 3,102$)

	BCI	LF	BCI + LF	BCI + LF + Resp.
Black Consciousness Index	0.155* (0.071)		0.073 (0.073)	0.101 (0.073)
Linked Fate (High)		0.288* (0.091)	0.251* (0.094)	0.252* (0.095)
Age (years)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Female	0.061 (0.095)	0.074 (0.095)	0.127 (0.094)	0.072 (0.095)
Education	0.131* (0.043)	0.123* (0.043)	0.135* (0.042)	0.124* (0.043)
Ideology (Conservative) Democrat	-0.252* (0.046)	-0.260* (0.045)	-0.248* (0.045)	-0.251* (0.046)
High Religiosity	-0.173 (0.095)	-0.161 (0.096)	-0.207* (0.094)	-0.169 (0.096)
Knows LGBTQ Person	0.477* (0.096)	0.477* (0.096)	0.512* (0.095)	0.464* (0.096)
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.565* (0.111)	-0.553* (0.111)		-0.564* (0.111)
Accepts Profiling	-0.067 (0.044)	-0.069 (0.044)		-0.068 (0.044)
Indiv. Attribution	0.037 (0.061)	0.040 (0.061)		0.047 (0.061)
Constant	1.518* (0.269)	1.387* (0.274)	1.004* (0.248)	1.387* (0.274)

* $p < .05$. Resp. = respectability politics controls (Two-Parent Emphasis, Accepts Profiling, Indiv. Attribution).

Table A.15: LGBTQ Linked Fate by Linked Fate Type (Typology Excludes LGBTQ LF)

LF Type	N	Mean LGBTQ LF	SD	% Lowest Rating
Individualist	568	1.60	0.85	60.7%
Cosmopolitan	291	2.05	1.10	44.7%
Exclusive	678	1.83	0.96	48.1%
Expansive	1300	2.44	1.06	25.5%

Note:

LGBTQ linked fate measured on 1-4 scale (higher = more linked fate). Typology uses immigrant and minority linked fate only.

Table A.16: Discriminant Validity: Expansive vs. Exclusive Contrasts

Outcome	Category	Estimate	p -value
Clinton vs. Trump	Political	0.118	0.625
Dem vs. Rep Congress	Political	0.020	0.926
Democrat Party ID	Political	0.060	0.643
Oppose Deportation	Immigration	-0.150	0.742
Reject 'Take Jobs'	Immigration	0.234	0.056 †
Support Black LG	Subgroup	0.770	<.001 ***
Vote Muslim Man	Subgroup	0.254	0.046 *

Note:

Logistic regression coefficients (log-odds). All models control for age, gender, education, ideology, and religiosity. Subgroup outcomes additionally control for knowing an LGBTQ person. Political outcomes limited to major-party voters (Clinton/Trump, Dem/Rep). † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

of structure (B182); (2) agreement that “racial profiling is sometimes necessary as a law enforcement tool” (BLA206); and (3) a net attribution score capturing individualist versus structural explanations of Black-white disparities (B177-B180).

Table A.17: Expansive vs. Exclusive Contrasts With and Without Respectability Controls

Outcome	Model	Estimate	<i>p</i> -value
Support Black LG	Baseline	0.695***	<.001
Support Black LG	With Respectability	0.74***	<.001
Vote Muslim Man	Baseline	0.311**	0.003
Vote Muslim Man	With Respectability	0.326**	0.002

Note:

Logistic regression coefficients (log-odds) for Expansive vs. Exclusive contrast. Baseline models control for age, gender, education, ideology, and religiosity. Respectability models add: two-parent family endorsement, racial profiling acceptance, and structural vs. individualist attributions of inequality. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A.17 shows that the Expansive-Exclusive contrast remains significant—and actually increases slightly in magnitude—after controlling for respectability politics. For support of Black LG individuals, the contrast increases from 0.70 to 0.74 ($p < .001$ in both cases). For Muslim candidate support, the contrast increases from 0.31 to 0.33 ($p < .01$ in both cases). In terms of predicted probabilities, even with respectability controls, Expansive types show 6–13 percentage point higher support than Exclusive types across outcomes (Support Black LG: 84% vs. 72%; Vote Muslim Man: 78% vs. 71%; Vote Muslim Woman: 83% vs. 75%). Respectability variables do predict outcomes in the expected direction: two-parent endorsement reduces support for both LG individuals and Muslim candidates. However, adding these controls strengthens rather than attenuates the typology effects—a suppression pattern suggesting that respectability functions as a largely orthogonal axis, akin to a second dimension of ideology that operates independently of the typology. This supports our argument that cross-group solidarity represents a distinct dimension of linked fate rather than merely reflecting the absence of respectability norms.

A.9 Study 2: Black Consciousness Index Construction

The Black Consciousness Index (BCI) is constructed from six items in the 2016 CMPS measuring behavioral engagement with and attitudinal commitment to the Black community.

Table A.18: Black Consciousness Index Components

Item	Code	Question Wording	Scale
<i>Behavioral Engagement</i>			
AA TV viewing	B144	In the past 12 months, have you watched a TV program about the African American experience?	Yes/No
AA website visits	B145	In the past 12 months, have you visited a website or blog about the African American experience?	Yes/No
<i>Attitudinal Commitment</i>			
Economic control	B148	Blacks should always support Black-owned businesses	1–5
Political control	B149	Blacks should control the government in mostly Black communities	1–5
Separate party	B153	Blacks should form their own political party	1–5
BLM support	C228	How much do you support or oppose the Black Lives Matter movement?	1–5

Note: Attitudinal items measured on 5-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree/oppose, 5 = Strongly agree/support).

The six items show acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.7$). The BCI correlates moderately with the binary linked fate item ($r = 0.29$), suggesting these measures capture related but distinct aspects of intragroup consciousness: linked fate captures subjective perceived interdependence of outcomes, while BCI captures behavioral and attitudinal expressions of intragroup consciousness.

For Study 2, we create a median split on BCI to produce high/low categories, which are then crossed with high/low cross-group linked fate (same measure as Study 1) to produce the four-type typology.

A.10 Study 2: BCI-Based Typology Regression Tables

Table A.19: BCI-Based Linked Fate Types and Support for Marginalized Groups (Multiple Imputation, $N=3,102$)

Variable	LG Support		Muslim Man		Muslim Woman	
	Coef	p	Coef	p	Coef	p
(Intercept)	1.34	<.001	1.17	<.001	1.08	<.001
Cosmopolitan	0.58	<.001	0.34	<.01	0.52	<.001
Exclusive	0.07	0.55	0.15	0.19	0.14	0.24
Expansive	0.79	<.001	0.53	<.001	0.56	<.001
Age	0.00	0.35	0.01	<.05	0.00	0.12
Female	0.05	0.6	-0.67	<.001	-0.33	<.001
Education	0.10	<.05	0.09	<.05	0.17	<.001
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.25	<.001	-0.15	<.001	-0.13	<.01
Democrat	-0.21	0.3	-0.21	0.29	-0.46	<.05
High Religiosity	-0.25	<.05	-0.30	<.01	-0.30	<.01
Knows LGBTQ	-0.23	0.21	NA	NA	NA	NA
Two-Parent Emphasis	-0.11	0.3	-0.80	<.001	-1.05	<.001
Accepts Profiling	0.43	<.001	0.06	0.48	-0.06	0.55
Indiv. Attribution	-0.63	<.001	-0.44	<.001	-0.43	<.001

Note: Reference category: Individualist. Muslim models exclude 'Knows LGBTQ' control.

Table A.20: Study 2: Expansive vs. Exclusive BCI-Based Type Contrasts

Outcome	Estimate	SE	z	p	Bonf.
Support Black LG	0.728	0.132	5.54	<.001	Yes
Vote Muslim Man	0.377	0.122	3.10	0.002	Yes
Vote Muslim Woman	0.423	0.130	3.27	0.001	Yes

Note:

Estimate = Expansive coefficient minus Exclusive coefficient (log-odds scale). Bonf. = survives Bonferroni correction for 3 comparisons ($p < .017$).

A.11 Study 3: Sample Characteristics

Table A.21: Summary Statistics by Candidate 1 Identity

	Straight Christian	Straight Muslim	Gay Christian	<i>p</i> -value
Age (yrs)	46.3 (16.2)	45.3 (16.0)	45.1 (15.5)	0.55
Education (yrs)	14.5 (2.3)	14.5 (2.3)	14.4 (2.0)	0.53
Race Shapes Beliefs (1-10)	7.1 (2.6)	7.3 (2.5)	6.9 (2.8)	0.15
Religion Shapes Beliefs (1-10)	5.9 (3.0)	5.8 (3.3)	6.0 (3.2)	0.68
% Female	80.1	80.6	81.4	0.91
% Linked Fate	68.9	71.0	74.6	0.24
% Religion: Christian	82.1	79.2	83.8	0.28
% Religion: Muslim	1.2	1.7	0.9	0.62
% Orientation: LGBT	5.5	3.7	5.6	0.41
% Orientation: Other	2.3	1.1	1.5	0.45
% Orientation: Straight	92.2	95.2	92.9	0.24
% Party ID: Dem	81.0	79.2	79.6	0.82
% Party ID: Rep	3.5	3.4	5.3	0.35
% Party ID: Other	15.6	17.5	15.0	0.66
% Ideology: Liberal	32.0	34.9	34.8	0.65
% Ideology: Moderate	52.4	45.6	46.0	0.13
% Ideology: Conservative	15.6	19.4	19.2	0.33
<i>n</i>	347	355	339	

Continuous variables report mean (SD); binary variables report percentage.

A.12 Study 3: Experimental Manipulations

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Religion	Christian	Christian
Race/Ethnicity	Black	Black
Sexuality	Straight	Straight
Age	37	40
Gender	Male	Male
Military Service	Served in U.S. military	Served in U.S. military
Party Affiliation	Democrat	Democrat
Policy Beliefs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Strong advocate for criminal justice reform and addressing police brutality ✓ Seeks to implement new work initiatives to reduce the employment rate ✓ Wants to increase funding for social security and social welfare programs that benefit families and children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Wants to work with fellow legislators to reduce the federal debt ✓ Wants to combat domestic and international terrorism ✓ Strong advocate for comprehensive immigration reform

Figure A.3: Control condition: Both candidates described as straight and Christian.

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Religion	Muslim	Christian
Race/Ethnicity	Black	Black
Sexuality	Straight	Straight
Age	37	40
Gender	Male	Male
Military Service	Served in U.S. military	Served in U.S. military
Party Affiliation	Democrat	Democrat
Policy Beliefs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Strong advocate for criminal justice reform and addressing police brutality ✓ Seeks to implement new work initiatives to reduce the employment rate ✓ Wants to increase funding for social security and social welfare programs that benefit families and children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Wants to work with fellow legislators to reduce the federal debt ✓ Wants to combat domestic and international terrorism ✓ Strong advocate for comprehensive immigration reform

Figure A.4: Muslim treatment: Candidate 1 described as Muslim.

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Religion	Christian	Christian
Race/Ethnicity	Black	Black
Sexuality	Gay	Straight
Age	37	40
Gender	Male	Male
Military Service	Served in U.S. military	Served in U.S. military
Party Affiliation	Democrat	Democrat
Policy Beliefs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Strong advocate for criminal justice reform and addressing police brutality ✓ Seeks to implement new work initiatives to reduce the employment rate ✓ Wants to increase funding for social security and social welfare programs that benefit families and children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Wants to work with fellow legislators to reduce the federal debt ✓ Wants to combat domestic and international terrorism ✓ Strong advocate for comprehensive immigration reform

Figure A.5: Gay treatment: Candidate 1 described as gay.

A.13 Study 3: Regression Tables

Table A.22: Odds of Voting for Candidate 1 (Base Models)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Candidate 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Muslim vs Christian	0.547*		0.498*	
	(0.106)		(0.104)	
Gay vs Straight		0.380*		0.336*
		(0.072)		(0.070)
Age (yrs)			1.003	0.993
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Female			1.070	2.035*
			(0.273)	(0.487)
Linked Fate: High			1.623*	1.442
			(0.355)	(0.327)
Race Shapes Beliefs			1.103*	1.051
			(0.048)	(0.044)
Religion Shapes Beliefs			0.903*	0.909*
			(0.036)	(0.035)
Education			0.968	0.924
			(0.044)	(0.044)
LGBT: Other			0.888	0.661
			(0.760)	(0.586)
LGBT: Straight			1.987	0.953
			(0.926)	(0.440)
Religion: Christian			0.673	1.109
			(0.210)	(0.328)
Religion: Muslim			1.504	1.168
			(1.451)	(1.188)
Party: Other			0.313*	0.352*
			(0.078)	(0.092)
Party: Republican			0.217*	0.167*
			(0.103)	(0.077)
Moderate			0.789	1.200
			(0.201)	(0.288)
Conservative			0.509*	0.439*
			(0.158)	(0.125)
Constant	5.547*	5.547*	6.728*	20.402*
	(0.828)	(0.828)	(5.847)	(18.513)
Observations	702	686	702	686
Log Likelihood	-347.119	-361.217	-309.206	-317.198
Akaike Inf. Crit.	698.237	726.433	650.413	666.395

Note:

* $p < 0.05$

Table A.23: Odds of Voting for Candidate 1 (Treatment x Linked Fate Models)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Candidate 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Muslim vs Christian	0.580 (0.181)		0.582 (0.196)	
Gay vs Straight		0.459* (0.147)		0.450* (0.162)
Linked Fate: High	2.069* (0.630)	2.069* (0.630)	1.812 (0.586)	1.847 (0.610)
Religion Shapes Beliefs			0.904* (0.036)	0.908* (0.035)
Age (yrs)			1.004 (0.007)	0.993 (0.006)
Female			1.069 (0.273)	2.002* (0.479)
Race Shapes Beliefs			1.107* (0.048)	1.057 (0.045)
Education			0.974 (0.044)	0.924 (0.044)
Religion: Christian			0.758 (0.228)	1.133 (0.330)
Religion: Muslim			1.473 (1.378)	1.169 (1.202)
Party: Other			0.307* (0.076)	0.355* (0.093)
Party: Republican			0.208* (0.098)	0.170* (0.078)
Moderate			0.803 (0.204)	1.207 (0.290)
Conservative			0.532* (0.163)	0.436* (0.123)
Muslim x Linked Fate: High	0.873 (0.350)		0.807 (0.348)	
Gay x Linked Fate: High		0.701 (0.281)		0.646 (0.286)
Constant	3.500* (0.810)	3.500* (0.810)	8.972* (7.421)	16.050* (13.758)
Observations	702	686	702	686
Log Likelihood	-341.800	-357.436	-310.539	-316.820
Akaike Inf. Crit.	691.601	722.872	651.079	663.641

Note:

* $p < 0.05$

Table A.24: Odds of Voting for Candidate 1 (Treatment x Religion Shapes Beliefs Models)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Candidate 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Muslim vs Christian	1.321 (0.600)		1.203 (0.574)	
Gay vs Straight		1.020 (0.459)		1.089 (0.506)
Religion Shapes Beliefs	0.986 (0.050)	0.986 (0.050)	0.986 (0.057)	1.026 (0.059)
Linked Fate: High			1.662* (0.366)	1.505 (0.346)
Age (yrs)			1.002 (0.007)	0.993 (0.007)
Female			1.088 (0.279)	2.014* (0.486)
Race Shapes Beliefs			1.099* (0.048)	1.049 (0.044)
Education			0.965 (0.044)	0.922 (0.045)
LGBT: Other			0.993 (0.856)	0.713 (0.636)
LGBT: Straight			2.015 (0.935)	0.959 (0.440)
Religion: Christian			0.680 (0.212)	1.088 (0.321)
Religion: Muslim			1.601 (1.557)	1.358 (1.406)
Party: Other			0.315* (0.078)	0.351* (0.092)
Party: Republican			0.210* (0.101)	0.147* (0.069)
Moderate			0.795 (0.203)	1.194 (0.289)
Conservative			0.504* (0.157)	0.425* (0.123)
Muslim x Religion Shapes Beliefs	0.868* (0.057)		0.868* (0.061)	
Gay x Religion Shapes Beliefs		0.856* (0.056)		0.827* (0.057)
Constant	6.025* (2.018)	6.025* (2.018)	4.176 (3.736)	10.262* (9.617)
Observations	702	686	702	686
Log Likelihood	-339.597	-351.900	-307.156	-313.407
Akaike Inf. Crit.	687.194	711.800	648.311	660.814

Note:

* $p < 0.05$

Note on coefficient interpretation: The treatment main effects (e.g., “Muslim vs Christian”) are conditional on religiosity = 0 (the scale minimum). The interaction terms (e.g., “Muslim × Religion Shapes Beliefs”) indicate how the treatment effect changes as religiosity increases. The combination of a positive treatment main effect and a negative interaction term means the treatment effect becomes increasingly negative at higher religiosity values, consistent with Figure 7.

Table A.25: Odds of Voting for Candidate 1 (Treatment x Ideology Models)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Candidate 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Muslim vs Christian	0.538* (0.121)		0.496* (0.118)	
Gay vs Straight		0.426* (0.095)		0.386* (0.091)
Conservative	0.387* (0.136)	0.387* (0.136)	0.585 (0.225)	0.566 (0.219)
Age (yrs)			1.003 (0.007)	0.994 (0.007)
Female			1.075 (0.274)	2.061* (0.494)
Linked Fate: High			1.636* (0.358)	1.436 (0.327)
Race Shapes Beliefs			1.110* (0.048)	1.050 (0.044)
Religion Shapes Beliefs			0.899* (0.036)	0.908* (0.035)
Education			0.970 (0.044)	0.922 (0.044)
LGBT: Other			0.855 (0.731)	0.697 (0.619)
LGBT: Straight			1.928 (0.893)	0.957 (0.444)
Religion: Christian			0.658 (0.204)	1.111 (0.329)
Religion: Muslim			1.429 (1.373)	1.289 (1.326)
Party: Other			0.303* (0.075)	0.363* (0.093)
Party: Republican			0.212* (0.101)	0.168* (0.077)
Muslim x Conservative	1.181 (0.535)		1.045 (0.511)	
Gay x Conservative		0.641 (0.290)		0.539 (0.266)
Constant	6.711* (1.167)	6.711* (1.167)	5.796* (4.943)	20.574* (18.457)
Observations	702	686	702	686
Log Likelihood	-340.179	-345.831	-309.640	-316.687
Akaike Inf. Crit.	688.359	699.662	651.281	665.374

Note:

* $p < 0.05$

A.14 Study 3: Keyword Analysis Methodology

The keyword analysis in Figure A.6 uses a combined measure detecting any occurrence of five identity-related terms: “Muslim,” “Christian,” “gay,” “straight,” or “military.” We adopted this combined approach because analyzing religion and sexuality keywords separately produced near-zero counts in control condition cells, causing estimation problems in the logistic regression models. The combined keyword measure captures whether respondents invoked any identity-related term when explaining their candidate choice. Including “military” (a characteristic shared by both candidates) did not meaningfully affect results but helped stabilize estimation. Both panels in Figure A.6 use this same combined outcome; Panel A shows the effect of varying candidate religion, while Panel B shows the effect of varying candidate sexual orientation. Table A.26 presents the full regression results.




Figure A.6: Study 3: Predicted probability of using identity keywords (any of ‘Muslim,’ ‘Christian,’ ‘gay,’ ‘straight,’ ‘military’) in open-ended responses when varying (A) candidate religion or (B) candidate sexual orientation. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. See Table A.26.

Table A.26: Odds of Using Identity Keyword (Base Models)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Use Identity Keyword			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Muslim vs Christian	9.379* (5.004)		9.773* (5.307)	
Gay vs Straight		10.506* (5.591)		9.830* (5.283)
Age (yrs)			0.995 (0.011)	0.999 (0.011)
Female			1.294 (0.619)	1.034 (0.437)
Linked Fate: High			0.766 (0.302)	5.136* (3.275)
Race Shapes Beliefs			1.001 (0.080)	1.129 (0.096)
Religion Shapes Beliefs			1.099 (0.081)	1.086 (0.071)
Education			1.062 (0.079)	0.957 (0.083)
Religion: Christian			3.905 (3.001)	0.714 (0.347)
Religion: Muslim			4.011 (5.569)	0.00000 (0.0003)
Party: Other			3.364* (1.390)	1.677 (0.774)
Party: Republican			2.526 (1.749)	3.006 (1.969)
Moderate			1.135 (0.560)	0.718 (0.288)
Conservative			3.007* (1.587)	1.209 (0.590)
Constant	0.012* (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.0004* (0.001)	0.002* (0.003)
Observations	702	686	702	686
Log Likelihood	-136.131	-138.690	-119.887	-126.967
Akaike Inf. Crit.	276.262	281.380	267.773	281.935

Note:

* $p < 0.05$

A.15 Study 3: Treatment \times LF-Religiosity Type Interaction

The main text reports that the treatment \times type interaction does not reach conventional significance. This interaction tests whether treatment effects vary across the four linked fate \times religiosity types—the key prediction of the two-dimensional framework. Table A.27 presents the full models. A joint test of the interaction terms (testing whether any treatment \times type coefficient differs from zero) yields $p = 0.068$, indicating that the gay treatment’s effect on candidate support differs across linked fate-religiosity combinations, consistent with our theoretical expectation that high-religiosity, high-linked-fate respondents (putatively Exclusive) would show larger treatment effects than low-religiosity, high-linked-fate respondents (putatively Expansive).

Table A.27: Study 3: Treatment \times LF-Religiosity Type

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Candidate 1 Muslim	Gay
Treatment	-0.643 (0.591)	-1.083 (0.594)
Low LF, High Relig	-0.849 (0.551)	-0.849 (0.551)
High LF, Low Relig	0.041 (0.555)	0.041 (0.555)
High LF, High Relig	0.205 (0.558)	0.205 (0.558)
Treatment \times Low LF, High Relig	-0.033 (0.704)	0.328 (0.714)
Treatment \times High LF, Low Relig	0.488 (0.704)	0.784 (0.707)
Treatment \times High LF, High Relig	-0.414 (0.683)	-0.523 (0.679)
Constant	1.856* (0.481)	1.856* (0.481)
Observations	702	686
Log Likelihood	-335.604	-348.030
Akaike Inf. Crit.	687.209	712.061

Note: * $p < 0.05$

A.16 Study 3: Treatment Effects by Linked Fate and Religiosity Type

Table A.28 presents treatment effects for both the Muslim and gay conditions by linked fate and religiosity type. The pattern is consistent across both treatments: High LF + Low Religiosity respondents (putatively Expansive) show smaller treatment effects than High LF + High Religiosity respondents (putatively Exclusive), though the effects are more pronounced for the gay treatment.

Table A.28: Treatment Effects by Linked Fate and Religiosity Type

Treatment	Type	Control (%)	Treatment (%)	Effect (pp)	p-value
Muslim Treatment					
Muslim	Low LF, Low Relig	86.5	77.1	9.4	0.276
Muslim	Low LF, High Relig	73.2	58.2	15.1	0.077
Muslim	High LF, Low Relig	87.0	85.1	1.9	0.684
Muslim	High LF, High Relig	88.7	73.2	15.5	0.002
Gay Treatment					
Gay	Low LF, Low Relig	86.5	68.4	18.1	0.068
Gay	Low LF, High Relig	73.2	56.2	17.0	0.056
Gay	High LF, Low Relig	87.0	83.2	3.8	0.435
Gay	High LF, High Relig	88.7	61.2	27.5	<.001

A.17 Study 3: LF \times Religiosity Type with Controls

Table A.29 presents the regression models with controls that generate Figure A.7.




Figure A.7: Study 3: Predicted probability of supporting Candidate 1 by Linked Fate and Religiosity Type for Muslim (A) and Gay (B) Treatments, with controls. Predictions from logistic regression models controlling for age, gender, education, ideology, and party identification. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Brackets show within-group treatment effect significance: n.s. = not significant, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. The pattern from Figure-8 holds with controls: High LF respondents with high religiosity (putatively Exclusive) show the largest treatment effects, and this is not driven by ideology or other demographics.

Table A.29: Study 3: Treatment \times LF-Religiosity Type with Controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Candidate 1	
	Muslim	Gay
Treatment	-0.477 (0.610)	-1.044 (0.629)
Low LF, High Relig	-0.684 (0.572)	-0.627 (0.584)
High LF, Low Relig	0.018 (0.572)	-0.036 (0.583)
High LF, High Relig	0.343 (0.578)	0.428 (0.591)
Age	0.002 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)
Female	0.042 (0.253)	0.704* (0.239)
Education	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.070 (0.048)
Ideology: Moderate	-0.330 (0.250)	0.147 (0.239)
Ideology: Conservative	-0.827* (0.304)	-0.907* (0.284)
Party: Other	-1.184* (0.242)	-1.062* (0.258)
Party: Republican	-1.676* (0.470)	-1.897* (0.460)
Treatment \times Low LF, High Relig	-0.219 (0.735)	0.218 (0.766)
Treatment \times High LF, Low Relig	0.294 (0.727)	0.727 (0.745)
Treatment \times High LF, High Relig	-0.650 (0.712)	-0.761 (0.721)
Constant	2.761* (0.877)	3.047* (0.925)
Observations	702	686

Note:

* $p < 0.05$

As shown in Figure A.7, the key pattern from the main text holds with controls: High LF + High Religiosity respondents (putatively Exclusive) show significant treatment effects in both conditions, while High LF + Low Religiosity respondents (putatively Expansive) do not. The contrast between these two high-LF groups does not reach conventional significance for the gay treatment ($p=.08$).

Conservative ideology and Republican/Other party identification are strong predictors of lower support for Candidate 1, suggesting that religiosity partly captures political orientation. This contrasts with the CMPS observational results (Studies 1–2), where the linked fate typology predicted support for marginalized subgroups even after controlling for ideology and party identification. The difference may reflect the smaller sample size in Study 3, the different demands of experimental versus observational contexts, or the possibility that religiosity operates partly through political orientation in shaping responses to social pressure.

A.18 Study 3: Survey Instrument Typo Analysis

The survey instrument contained a typographical error describing Candidate 1 as wanting to “reduce the employment rate” rather than “reduce the unemployment rate.” This error appeared identically across all three experimental conditions. We examined whether this could bias results through motivated reasoning—subjects uncomfortable with the treated identity seizing on the error as rationalization for defection.

Analysis of open-ended responses finds 18 respondents (1.7%) mentioned the error, distributed evenly across conditions (Table A.30). Of these, 12 explicitly recognized it as a typo while still supporting Candidate 1 or noting it as something they would “change.” Only 5 respondents cited the error negatively without recognizing it as a typo. Critically, zero gay-condition respondents cited it negatively (compared to 3 in Control and 2 in Muslim), the opposite of what motivated reasoning would predict. We conclude the typo cannot explain treatment effects.

Table A.30: Distribution of Respondents Mentioning Employment Rate Error

Condition	Recognized as Typo	Cited Negatively (No Typo Recognition)	Total
Control	3	3	6
Muslim	4	2	6
Gay	5	0	5
Total	12	5	17

Note:

“Recognized as Typo” includes respondents who explicitly noted the error was likely a typo. “Cited Negatively” includes respondents who mentioned the error as a concern without recognizing it as a typo. One additional respondent (Muslim condition) noted only “typo in candidate 1 description” without specifying which error, bringing the total mentions to 18.

Table A.31 presents illustrative responses from each category.

%TC:endignore

Table A.31: Illustrative Responses Mentioning Employment Rate Error

Category	Condition	Response
Recognized as Typo	Control	Unless it's a typo, I don't know why anyone would want to reduce the employment rate. Did you mean unemployment rate?
Recognized as Typo	Muslim	Prefer interest in social security and social issues. Would change what appears to be a typo in employment statement.
Recognized as Typo	Gay	Assuming the person who made this survey meant that Candidate 1 would work to reduce the unemployment rate rather than the employment rate, Candidate 1 is tackling several very important issues...
Recognized as Typo	Gay	There was a phrase in candidate's view which were troubling, that he wanted to reduce the rate of employment. It should have been reduce the rate of unemployment.
Cited Negatively	Control	I chose Candidate 2, because Candidate 1 wanted to reduce the employment rate.
Cited Negatively	Muslim	I had an issue with Candidate 1 regarding employment.
Cited Negatively	Control	I'm not a fan that he wants to lower the employment rate.